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Abstract
We provide a repeated-choice foundation for stochastic choice. We obtain necessary
and sufficient conditions under which an agent’s observed stochastic choice can be
represented as a limit frequency of optimal choices over time. In our model, the agent
repeatedly chooses today’s consumption and tomorrow’s continuation menu, aware that
future preferences will evolve according to a subjective ergodic utility process. Using
our model, we demonstrate how not taking into account the intertemporal structure of
the problem may lead an analyst to biased estimates of risk preferences. Estimation of
preferences can be performed by the analyst without explicitly modeling continuation
problems (i.e. stochastic choice is independent of continuation menus) if and only if
the utility process takes on the standard additive and separable form. Applications
∗ We want to thank Andy Atkeson, Simon Board, Larry Epstein, Mira Frick, Faruk Gul, Ryota Iijima,
Asen Kochov, Bart Lipman, Rosa Matzkin, Tomasz Strzalecki, John Rust, Yi Xing and seminar audiences at
the SAET Conference at Academia Sinica, CIREQ Montreal Micro Theory Conference, Georgetown, Mary-
land, University of Montreal, Michigan, Rochester, University of Tokyo, LSE, Yale, LA Theory Conference,
Caltech Junior Theory Workshop, RUD Conference at PSE, Zurich, Queen Mary, Royal Holloway, UCL,
Pittsburg-Carnegie Mellon, Penn State, Boston University, and the Ohio state university for their helpful
comments. We especially thank Kim Border for several discussions which helped us with the axiomatic
characterization of the model We also thank Jeffrey Zeidel for his excellent research assistance for the nu-
merical result. Financial support from the NSF under awards SES-1558757 (Saito), SES-1919263 (Saito)
and SES-1919275 (Lu) are gratefully acknowledged.
include dynamic discrete choice models when agents have non-trivial intertemporal
preferences, such as Epstein-Zin preferences. We provide a numerical example which
shows the significance of biases caused by ignoring the agent’s Epstein-Zin preferences.
1 Introduction
Modeling choice behavior as stochastic is common across many economic applications. In
many of these applications, stochasticity is interpreted as a result of unobserved heterogene-
ity in a population of agents (henceforth, the “population interpretation”). On the other
hand, the psychological origins of stochastic choice point to a single-agent interpretation.1
There, stochasticity is interpreted as a result of a single agent making choices from the same
decision problem repeatedly (henceforth, the “individual interpretation”). The literature on
stochastic choice, however, has mostly taken such choice frequencies as given without con-
sidering when such a repeated-choice interpretation is possible and the underlying dynamic
process generating stochastic choice.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the single-agent interpretation of stochastic choice
and provide the first foundation for the interpretation. Given an agent’s stochastic choice,
we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions under which the agent’s observed stochastic
choice can be represented as a limit frequency of his optimal repeated choices over time;
in the representation, the agent repeatedly chooses today’s consumption and tomorrow’s
continuation menu, aware that future preferences will evolve according to a subjective utility
process.
Applying our model, we show that whenever the agent has non-trivial intertemporal
preferences (e.g. Epstein-Zin preferences), his stochastic choice would be highly sensitive
to continuation menus. Even seemingly a minor change to continuation menus such as the
change of frequency of repetition of choices affect the agent’s stochastic choice in a system-
atic way. For instance, a stochastic Epstein-Zin agent with a low preference for consumption
smoothing compared to risk aversion would choose risky options more likely as the choice
frequency becomes higher. As a result, failure to take repetition into account would natu-
rally lead an analyst (an outside observer such as an econometrician) to underestimate the
1 Early work on models of stochastic choice include Thurstone (1927), Luce (1959), Block and Marschak
(1960), and Falmagne (1978). The adoption of these models in economics to study unobserved heterogeneity
naturally led to the population interpretation. For an overview of this history, see McFadden (2001).
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agent’s risk aversion. In fact, in a numerical example, we show that even if an agent is sig-
nificantly risk-averse and should not choose a risky option over a safe option in an atemporal
decision problem, he will choose the risky option over the safe option more than 50% in a
repeated choice between the two option. Thus the analyst who ignores the intertemporal
concerns misunderstands that the agent is risk-loving very likely. Even with the population
interpretation, we can use our results to understand the systematic ways in which general
intertemporal preferences affect the estimation of any dynamic discrete choice model.
In the following, we provide the overview of our results in more detail. First, to present
our model, we describe the formal setup. Based on the works of Kreps and Porteus (1978),
Epstein and Zin (1989), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), we develop an infinite-horizon
framework to study the agent’s problem. Every period, the agent faces a menu (i.e., a
choice set) which consists of risky prospects over consumption today and a continuation
menu tomorrow. We focus on menus such that regardless of what the agent chooses or
which outcome is realized, he will always face the same menu again after some finite time.
Call such menus repeated. In an infinite time horizon, the structure of a repeated menu
guarantees that the agent will choose from the same menu infinitely many times, generating
a time series of choices. As a result, the agent’s stochastic choice can be interpreted as the
long-run frequency of choices from the repeated menu. We focus on repeated menus for
simplicity and the fact that they are sufficient for identifying and characterizing our model,
although we can extend our domain to include richer menus.2
Based on the setup, we introduce a new tractable model of stochastic choice. The agent’s
utility at time period t depends on some state variable st that evolves according to an ergodic
Markov process. The Markov process is fixed and known to the agent but unknown to the
analyst, which makes the agent’s choice stochastic from the perspective of the analyst. For
example, the state could be the agent’s mood on a particular day, which affects how risk-
averse and how impatient he is that day. Given the realization of state st at time t, the
agent’s utility of a pair (c, z) of today’s consumption c and tomorrow’s continuation menu z
is recursively given by
ut (c, z) = φst
(
c,Est
[
max
p∈z
ut+1 (p)
])
. (1)
There are two parts to this utility. First, the stochastic aggregator φst specifies the agent’s
2 For instance, we can consider menus that repeated with some probability. This extension is straightfor-
ward as long as the repetition probability does not depend on the agent’s choice (otherwise, selection issues
may complicate the identification exercise). See the discussion at the end of Section 2.1
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intertemporal attitudes toward current consumption and future continuation value. Second,
continuation values are evaluated by taking expectations with respect to the Markov process
of the state. In other words, the agent is fully sophisticated; he knows the Markov process
and takes expectations with the understanding that he will be choosing from the menu z
tomorrow. The utility function (1) can be seen as a stochastic version of the model from
Kreps and Porteus (1978) where continuation values are evaluated according to the linear
representation of Dekel et al. (2001).
The utility process ut defined in (1) is ergodic and describes the agent’s stochastic in-
tertemporal preferences at every time period t. In our representation theorem, for any menu
z that repeats every t periods, the probability ρz (p) that an option p is chosen from the
menu repeated z is given by
ρz (p) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
1 {uit+1 (p) ≥ uit+1 (q) for all q ∈ z} , (2)
where 1 {·} is the indicator function and ut (p) =
∫
ut (c, z) dp with ut (c, z) described as in
(1). In this case, we say ρ is ergodic. Here, the probability that p is chosen from a set z is
exactly the long-run frequency of the event that p is the best element in z according to the
utility process. This is exactly the individual interpretation of stochastic choice models. We
thus provide a theoretical foundation for this interpretation.
The representation has strong uniqueness properties. Despite the generality of the model
and the fact that our domain is restricted to only repeated menus, we show that the analyst
can fully identify the agent’s utility process from stochastic choice over repeated binary
menus.
To study how continuation menus and intertemporal preferences affect stochastic choice,
we consider three applications that illustrate the types of biases that can arise if the analyst
ignores repetition and the agent’s intertemporal preferences. In all applications, we consider a
special case in which the stochastic aggregator φ takes on the well-known formula provided by
Epstein and Zin (1989); we call this special case stochastic Epstein-Zin. Consider an analyst
interested in eliciting an agent’s risk aversion. Understanding that the agent’s preferences
may be stochastic, the analyst asks the agent to repeatedly choose between a safe option
(e.g., $3 for sure) and a risky option (e.g., $10 or $0 with equal probability) every day. If
the agent is myopic and only considers current consumption, then the long-run frequency
of choosing the safe option would correspond exactly to the probability that the agent is
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risk-averse, which is the standard individual interpretation of stochastic choice.
However, if the agent is sophisticated, then he would take into account the fact that
he will be choosing again between the safe and risky options tomorrow. We show that if
he has Epstein-Zin preferences and his risk aversion is higher than his desire for consump-
tion smoothing, then the probability of choosing the risky option increases when repetition
becomes more frequent. For such an agent, the risky option feels “safer” under repeated
choice; intuitively, even if today’s outcome is bad, repeating the choice means that there is
always a chance that tomorrow’s outcome will be good. As a result, the risky option becomes
more attractive as repetition becomes more frequent. This is a novel behavioral phenomenon
absent in stochastic choice models that do not explicitly address repetition.
Based on the first application, in the second application, we show that if the analyst
misspecified the model and ignored repetition, then she will underestimate the agent’s atem-
poral risk aversion. Moreover to evaluate the size of the biases, we study a numeral example
assuming various distributions of the risk-aversion parameter and the consumption smooth-
ing parameter. Under various specifications of the distributions, we found that even if an
agent is risk-averse almost surely, the agent will choose the risky option with probability
more than 95% because of his intertemporal preferences; thus the analyst who ignores the
agent’s Epstein-Zin preferences misunderstands that the agent is risk-loving very likely. All
this demonstrates the importance of modeling repetition when analyzing stochastic choice
data.
In the last application, we consider a simple two-period example of a dynamic discrete
choice model. Based on the same insight as in the first and the second applications, we
illustrate the inherent inference issues that can arise if intertemporal preferences are not
taken into account in applications of dynamic discrete choice estimation.
The three applications suggest that modeling repetition is crucial for inference when
agents have non-standard intertemporal preferences. We also address the question of when an
agent’s preferences can be correctly inferred without modeling repetition explicitly. We define
this formally using an axiom called Independence of Continuation Menu (ICM) and show that
it is satisfied if and only if the utility process is standard, i.e., the stochastic aggregator takes
the form of φs (c, v) = (1− βs)ws (c)+βsv where ws is a random von Neumann–Morgenstern
(vNM) utility function and βs is a random discount factor. In the case of stochastic Epstein-
Zin preferences, Indifference to Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty (IRU) would ensure
that the utility process is standard. In general, however, this is not true; IRU characterizes
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a stochastic version of Uzawa-Epstein preferences in which discount factors also depend on
consumption.3 In this case, ICM would still be violated since continuation menus would
still affect inference. We show that the gap between IRU and ICM is exactly a repeated
version of the classic independence axiom, which we call Repeated Independence (RI). We
thus demonstrate the following three-way equivalence:
ICM ⇔ IRU + RI ⇔ Standard Utility.
The takeaway is that any generalization of standard utility will require the analyst to take
into account repeated choice when conducting estimation or inference from stochastic choice.
On the other hand, if agents are standard, then the analyst can conduct estimation ignoring
continuation menus which would be useful in situations when continuation menus themselves
may be unobservable.
Finally, we provide an axiomatic characterization of our model. While we focus only on
the smaller domain of repeated menus, we show that the set of repeated menus is in fact
dense in the set of all menus. In other words, for any generic menu z, we can construct a
sequence of repeated menus that approximate z with arbitrary closeness. By considering a
continuous extension, we can therefore focus on a stochastic choice function ρ over all finite
(but not necessarily repeated) menus.
To axiomatize our representation, we construct a random expected utility model on an
infinite-dimensional space where continuation menus are evaluated according to the represen-
tation in Dekel et al. (2001). This exercise faces two technical challenges. First, extending
Dekel et al. (2001) to countably-additive probability measures on an infinite-dimensional
space is difficult due to the lack of compactness in the infinite-dimensional setting (see Kr-
ishna and Sadowski (2014) for an outline of the technical issues). Second, the extension of
Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) to an infinite-dimensional space with a countably-additive mea-
sure is also highly nontrivial.4 We provide a unified methodology using the set of Lipschitz
continuous utilities to address both challenges.
Our axioms combine the axioms of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) with the linearity and con-
tinuity axioms of Dekel et al. (2001). We introduce three new axioms. The first two axioms
(Deterministic Stationarity and Average Stationarity) are weaker analogs of the stationarity
3 The model is originally proposed by Uzawa (1968) and later axiomatized by Epstein (1983) in an
extended lottery setup.
4 See Ma (2018) and Frick et al. (2018) for recent extensions.
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axiom of Koopmans (1960) for stochastic choice.5 They allow us to construct a recursive and
stationary Markov utility process. The last axiom (D-continuity) is a continuity condition
stating that preference for flexibility is robust to small perturbations. It ensures ergodicity of
the utility process. Finally, the representation is obtained by an application of the Birkhoff
ergodic theorem. See the discussion after Theorem 4 for details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our repeated menus
setup and our model with ergodic utilities. Section 3 presents the three applications of esti-
mation under stochastic Epstein-Zin and dynamic discrete choice. In Section 4 we introduce
ICM and its relationship with intertemporal preferences. Finally, Section 5 contains the
axiomatic characterization. All omitted proofs are contained in the appendices.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is mainly related to four strands of literature in the following areas: (i) random
expected utility, (ii) menu preferences, (iii) intertemporal choice, and (iv) dynamic discrete
choice. The first strand of literature is on stochastic choice models of random expected
utility. Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), Ahn and Sarver (2013), Lu (2016), and Lu and Saito
(2018) study static models of stochastic choice, while Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) and
Frick et al. (2018) study dynamic random choice.6 Our paper is most closely related to
the latter. The main differences are in motivation and the mathematical modeling. Given
their motivation to study history dependency, Frick et al. (2018) study stochastic choice
conditional on past menus, past choices, and consumption realizations, while our stochastic
choice function is not conditional on these. Although they can interpret stochastic choice in
their model as the result of a single agent, in contrast to our paper, they mainly focus on the
population interpretation as it facilitates the interpretation of their primitive.7 They consider
any menus in a finite-horizon setup, while we consider repeated menus in an infinite-horizon
setup.8
5 A similar axiom appears in Lu and Saito (2018).
6 A more recent paper is Duraj (2018), which extends Frick et al. (2018) to a setting with an objective
state space. Ke (2018) also studies expected utility in a Luce model.
7 As explained above, our motivation is to provide a theoretical repeated-choice foundation for the stochas-
tic choice of a single agent. Although we can adopt the population interpretation in some cases (see Section
3.4), we mainly focus on the individual interpretation.
8 On the technical side, they also provide an extension of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) to an infinite-
dimensional setting. While they use the finiteness condition of Ahn and Sarver (2013) to extend the rep-
resentation to a finitely additive measure, we use Lipschitz continuity to extend the representation to a
6
The second relevant strand consists of the modern literature on menu preferences, which
began with Dekel et al. (2001) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). The former was extended to
an objective state space by Dillenberger et al. (2014). Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) extends
menu preferences to a dynamic setting by proposing an infinite-horizon consumption setup,
which we have adopted in our paper. Other papers that make use of this framework include
Higashi et al. (2009) and Krishna and Sadowski (2016). The first considers a random dis-
counting model in which the agent anticipates the stochasticity of his future discount factor.
The second extends the additive linear representation into an infinite-dimensional space.
While their extension is finitely additive, our extension is countably additive while still pre-
serving the uniqueness of the representation. More recently, Krishna and Sadowski (2014)
and Dillenberger et al. (2017) augment the dynamic setup with an informational structure.
See Dillenberger et al. (2017) for a review of this literature.
Thirdly, our paper is related to the classical literature on intertemporal choice. As men-
tioned, our model can be seen as a stochastic version of Kreps and Porteus (1978), including
the popular special case of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). We also characterize
a stochastic version of Uzawa-Epstein preferences, which was originally proposed by Uzawa
(1968) and later axiomatized by Epstein (1983) in an extended setup with lotteries.9 More
recently, Bommier et al. (2017) also characterize standard utility via a monotonicity axiom.
Finally, our paper is related to the large literature on dynamic discrete choice. While
the importance of considering non-standard intertemporal preferences (e.g., a preference for
early resolution of uncertainty) is well-known, the literature has assumed standard additively
separable preferences for the sake of tractability.10 As far as we know, we are the first to
analyze the effects of non-standard intertemporal preferences on inference under dynamic
discrete choice. In addition, our ergodic representation (2) features in estimation methods
of dynamic discrete choice models. Expanding on the work of Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller
(1993) introduced an estimation methodology that is computationally less demanding. Their
method of calculating conditional choice probabilities (CCP) from a sequences of choices uses
a formula similar to our ergodic representation (2). On the other hand, a typical model in
countably additive one.
9 Recent papers that study the macroeconomic implications of stochastic intertemporal preferences include
Alvarez and Atkeson (2017) and Barro et al. (2017).
10 From Rust (1994), “expected-utility models imply that agents are indifferent about the timing of the
resolution of uncertain events, whereas human decision-makers seem to have definite preferences over the
time at which uncertainty is resolved. The justification for focusing on expected utility is that it remains
the most tractable framework for modeling choice under uncertainty.”
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dynamic discrete choice assumes both observable states as well as unobservable states. While
our model only includes unobservable states, it would be possible to extend our model to
allow for observable states as well.11
2 A Model of Ergodic Utility
In this section, we first formally define repeated menus and then introduce our stochastic
choice primitive. We then define a utility process and present our general model, an ergodic
representation of stochastic choice. Finally, we discuss identification and uniqueness.
2.1 Repeated Menus
This section describes the basic setup of the model. Let time T = {1, 2, . . .} be discrete and
M = [0, m] denote a closed interval representing consumption (e.g., money). The agent is
faced with an infinite-horizon consumption problem (IHCP), that is, a menu of choice options
in which each option corresponds to a lottery over consumption today and a continuation
menu tomorrow. We will refer to IHCPs simply as menus and denote them by z ∈ Z. From
Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), we know that Z is homeomorphic to K (∆ (M × Z)), where
∆ (·) denotes the set of probability measures and K (·) denotes the set of nonempty compact
subsets. Thus, we will associate Z with K (∆ (M × Z)) without loss of generality. For any
p ∈ ∆(M × Z), pM ∈ ∆(M) denotes the marginal distribution of p on M .
We also let X = M × Z denote the set of possible outcomes. For x ∈ X, we sometimes
let x ∈ ∆X denote the degenerate lottery δx. For p ∈ ∆X, we also use p ∈ Z to denote the
singleton menu {p}. We let ap+ (1− a) q ∈ ∆X denote the usual mixture between any two
probability measures p, q ∈ ∆X and a ∈ [0, 1].
The main focus of our study will be on menus that repeat themselves after a fixed number
of periods. The following example illustrates what we mean by such repeated menus.
Example 1 (Safe vs. Risky Option). Consider an analyst interested in eliciting an agent’s
risk aversion which may be stochastic every period. Every day, the agent is offered a choice
between a safe option b and a risky option r from the menu z = {b, r}. The safe option
b ∈ ∆X yields $3 for sure today and the menu z ∈ Z again for sure tomorrow. The risky
11 Such an extension would study stochastic choices conditional on the observable state, which corresponds
exactly to CCP.
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option r ∈ ∆X yields either $10 or $0 with equal probability today and the menu z ∈ Z again
for sure tomorrow. Note that the agent is sophisticated and understands that regardless of
what he chooses today and which outcome is realized, he will always be faced with the menu
z again for sure tomorrow.
Example 1 illustrates a menu that is repeated every period. More generally, we consider
menus such that, regardless of what the agent chooses and which outcome is realized, he
will always face the menu again for sure after a fixed number of time periods. Formally, for
z ∈ Z, let R0 (z) = {z} and for t ∈ T , define
Rt (z) := K (∆ (M ×Rt−1 (z))) .
Thus, Rt (z) ⊂ Z are the subset of menus that yield z for sure after t periods.
Definition. A menu z is t-period if z ∈ Rt (z). The menu z is repeated if it is t-period for
some t > 0.
The menu in Example 1 is 1-period since z ∈ R1 (z). Let Z
r ⊂ Z denote the set of
repeated menus. In general, for a repeated menu, the agent will always face the same menu
again after some fixed number of time periods. For example, if the menu is t-period, then
the agent chooses from the menu at periods 1, 1+ t, 1+2t and so forth. Since this is repeated
ad infinitum, this can generate an infinite time series of choice data.
Repeated menus have three interesting properties. First, in a repeated menu, repetition
is completely independent of the agent’s choices. As a result, the analyst need not worry
about selection biases interfering with the data collection process.
Second, even though repeated menus form a small subset of menus, they are rich enough
to fully identify and characterize our model. In other words, the analyst can without loss
only focus on repeated menus for identifying the parameters of our model (see Section 2.5).
The reason for this is that repeated menus are dense in the set of all menus, i.e. they can
be used to approximate any menu. We discuss this property further in Section 5.1.
Third, there is always some minimal t∗ for which z is t∗-period. Note that every t-period
menu is also trivially kt-period for any positive integer k. In fact, t∗ is the greatest common
divisor of all possible periods of the menu; this is simply the first time z appears after the
initial period. See Section F.2 in the Appendix for details.
Finally, note that while we focus on repeated menus for simplicity and the fact that they
are sufficient for identification and characterization, we can extend our setup to incorporate
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more common consumption-savings problems. For instance, instead of repeated menus that
repeated with probability one, we can consider menus that repeated with some positive
probability. For example, menu z could consist of two options, where each option yields z
tomorrow with probability p and some other menu with probability 1−p. Such extensions are
straightforward as long as the repetition probability p does not depend on the agent’s choice;
otherwise, identification may be complicated by selection issues where a menu’s occurrence
depends on the agent’s past choices. We can then approximate any consumption-saving
problem by making the probability of repetition arbitrarily small.12
2.2 Stochastic Choice
In our model, the main observable data, or primitive, is stochastic choice. Given repeated
menus, we can interpret stochastic choice as the long-run frequency of the time series of
choices. This interpretation of stochastic choice is standard in the literature, although it
has not been modeled explicitly. For instance, in the random expected utility model of Gul
and Pesendorfer (2006), stochastic choice can be interpreted as the long-run frequency of the
time series choices from 1-period menus. See Luce (1959) and Luce and Suppes (1965) for
more detailed descriptions of the individual interpretation of stochastic choice.
We now provide a formal definition of stochastic choice. Let Zf ⊂ Z denote the set of
finite menus and let Z∗ = Zr ∩ Zf denote the set of finite repeated menus.
Definition. A stochastic choice is a mapping ρ : Z∗ → ∆(∆X) such that for every z ∈ Z∗,
ρz is a probability distribution on z.
Given a repeated menu z ∈ Z∗ and an option p ∈ z, the stochastic choice ρz (p) designates
the probability of choosing p from z. We deal with ties following Lu (2016) and Lu and Saito
(2018) in allowing for some probabilities to be unspecified. This is analogous to how under
standard deterministic choice, indifference characterizes exactly when the model is silent
about which option the agent will choose. This approach allows the analyst to be agnostic
about data that is orthogonal to the parameters of interest. For example, if two options are
tied, then the stochastic choice is silent about the choice frequency for each option. Formally,
we model this as non-measurability and let ρ denote the corresponding outer measure without
12 Note that if the menu never repeats, then choice is deterministic rather than stochastic choice as the
analyst never observes the agent choosing again from the same menu.
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loss of generality.13 To simplify notation going forward, we sometimes let ρ (z, y) = ρz∪y (z)
for z, y ∈ Z∗.14 Thus, ρ (p, q) denotes the frequency with which p is chosen over q.
We follow the literature on stochastic choice in assuming that the analyst only observes
stochastic choice (i.e. the long-run choice frequency) and not the actual time path of choices.
This is common in many empirical applications of stochastic choice, especially those that
adopt the population interpretation. In dynamic discrete choice for instance, the analyst
collects choices across both time and agents who are observationally identical under a stan-
dard i.i.d. assumption.15 Since agents are i.i.d. across time, keeping track of the actual time
series choice data is unnecessary so most models assume only stochastic choice is observable.
For the individual interpretation, our paper is the first to connect stochastic choice with
long-run choice frequencies; we represent stochastic choice as if it is generated from an infinite
time series of optimal choices. Our focus on stochastic choice as a primitive is motivated
by the existing literature and the fact that stochastic choice in our model is sufficient for
identifying all the relevant parameters (see Theorem 1). Studying models that adopt time
series choice data as a primitive would be interesting avenues for future research.16
2.3 Utility Process
In our model, the agent’s utility at every period is stochastic and depends on the realization
of state variable s ∈ S that is unobserved by the analyst. We could interpret S as a set
of subjective states that influence the agent’s utility. For example, the state could be the
agent’s mood on a particular day, which affects how risk-averse or how patient he is on that
day. We could also interpret the state as the realization of some private news arriving every
period which affects the agent’s utility that period.
The state evolves according to a Markov process (st)t∈T with transition probabilities
P : S → ∆S and a stationary distribution pi ∈ ∆S. The Markov process is fixed and known
to the agent but unknown to the analyst. We assume the Markov process satisfies the
13 Let F be a σ-algebra on ∆X . Given any z ∈ Z∗, let ρz be a measure on the σ-algebra generated by
F ∪ {z}. We can let ρ denote the outer measure with respect to this σ-algebra without loss of generality.
See Lu (2016) for details.
14 Note that if z contains no ties, then ρ (z, y) =
∑
p∈z ρz∪y (p) as all choice probabilities are specified.
Otherwise, ρz∪y (z) denotes the outer measure.
15 That is, the distribution of states is i.i.d. across both time and agents.
16 If we consider the time series of choices as a primitive, then the behavioral restrictions (on time series
choice data) for representation would be more stringent. This is because there are different choice paths that
generate the same long-run choice frequency. We thank Tomasz Strzalecki for discussions on this issue.
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continuity condition that Ps ≥ δpi for some δ > 0. This ensures that the Markov process has
full support with respect to its stationary distribution and guarantees ergodicity.17 Going
forward, we let [P ] denote such a Markov process on the subjective state space.
We now describe the agent’s utility. Let U denote the set of all utilities u : X → [0, 1]
normalized such that u (x) = 0 and u (x¯) = 1, where x and x¯ correspond to consuming 0
and m forever, respectively.18 For any measurable u ∈ U , we let
u (p) :=
∫
X
u(x)dp
denote the expected utility of p ∈ ∆X.
Every period t ∈ T , a state st ∈ S realizes and determines two things: (i) the agent’s
utility ust ∈ U at period t, and (ii) his expectation Est about next period’s state st+1 ∈ S
according to the transition probability Pst . For example, the agent’s mood determines his
risk aversion and discount factor today and also informs his beliefs about his mood tomorrow.
The agent is fully sophisticated and has correct beliefs; he anticipates what his mood will
be tomorrow in order to determine his utility tomorrow as well as his beliefs about what his
mood will be the day after, and so forth.
Following Kreps and Porteus (1978), we model utilities recursively as aggregator functions
of current consumption and future continuation value. To accommodate changing utilities,
we allow the aggregator function to be stochastic. A stochastic aggregator φs (c, v) specifies
how the agent evaluates his current consumption c versus his future continuation value v
given state s ∈ S. Formally, the stochastic aggregator φs : M × [0, 1] → [0, 1] is Lipschitz
continuous (with some bound N) and strictly increasing in the second argument.19 Since
the agent anticipates that he may be choosing again next period, future continuation values
are evaluated via the additive linear representation of Dekel et al. (2001). We now define a
utility process as follows.
Definition. A stochastic process (ut)t∈T on U is a utility process if there exists a Markov
17 The classic Doeblin’s condition states that Pns ≥ δλ for some n ≥ 1 and probability measure λ. Our
condition obtains if we set n = 1 and λ = pi.
18 We do not need the range of utility to be [0, 1]. Any compact interval works. For example, in the latter
section where we consider stochastic Epstein-Zin preferences, the range is [0,m], where m is the largest
monetary prize.
19Remember that [0, 1] is the range of u ∈ U . If we change the range of u ∈ U , the domain and the
range of φs must be changed accordingly. See footnote 18. In a latter section where we consider stochastic
Epstein-Zin preferences, φs is a function from M ×M to M . All proofs and results go through as long as
the range is a compact interval.
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process [P ] on S and a stochastic aggregator φ such that a.s.
ut (c, z) = φst
(
c,Est
[
sup
p∈z
ut+1 (p)
])
, (3)
where the expectation Est is taken with respect to Pst .
In this case, we say the utility process is generated by (P, φ). At a period t ∈ T , if st = s
for some s ∈ S, we sometimes write us or ust, instead of ut.
Every utility process is also an ergodic Markov process on the space of utilities. To see
why it is a Markov process, note that if us = us′, then the agent’s expectations Es and Es′
are the same. Since the agent has correct beliefs, this means that the distribution of the
next period’s utility induced by Ps and Ps′ is also the same. Moreover, the following lemma
shows that the utility process is ergodic as well.
Lemma 1. A utility process is an ergodic Markov process.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
2.4 Ergodic Representation of Stochastic Choice
We are now ready to define the main model. We say the utility process is regular if us (p) =
us (q) with pi-probability of either zero or one for all p, q ∈ ∆X. In other words, ties either
never occur or occur for sure.
Definition. ρ is ergodic if there exists a regular utility process generated by (P, φ) such that
for any t-period z ∈ Z∗, a.s.
ρz (p) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=0
1 {uit+1 (p) ≥ uit+1 (q) for all q ∈ z} ,
If ρ is ergodic, then we say it is represented by (P, φ).
In our model, the stochastic choice of an option p ∈ z corresponds exactly to the long-
run frequency of optimally choosing p in an infinite sequence of choices by the agent. At
every period, p is chosen only if it is ranked the highest in z according to realization of
the utility process u. Recall that the utility process has a rich intertemporal structure as
discussed previously. Note that this is an as-if representation that corresponds exactly to the
individual interpretation of stochastic choice in a repeated setup. Moreover, this features
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prominently in dynamic discrete choice estimation.20 In Section 5, we provide the axiomatic
characterization of the representation.
For a simple illustration, consider a well-known special case of our model.
Definition. A utility process is standard if there is a random vNM utility ws and a random
discount factor βs such that a.s.
φs (c, v) = (1− βs)ws (c) + βsv. (4)
The standard utility function is not only additively separable across today’s consumption
and future value; moreover the function is linear in the future value. The standard utility
process correspond to the random expected utility model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
Example 2 (Random Expected Utility). Let [P ] denote an i.i.d process and let the stochastic
aggregator satisfy
φs (c, v) = (1− βs)ws (c) + βsv,
where ws is a random vNM utility and βs ∈ (0, 1) is a random discount factor. Thus,
ut (c, z) = (1− βs)wst (c) + βstE
[
sup
p∈z
ut+1 (p)
]
.
Suppose ρ is represented by (P, φ). Consider a 1-period z ∈ Z∗. As a result, for any p, q ∈ z,
we have ut (p) ≥ ut (q) if and only if wst (p) ≥ wst (q) by canceling out the continuation value
of the menu z. From the ergodic representation, we thus have
ρz (p) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 {wsi (p) ≥ wsi (q) for all q ∈ z} = pi {s ∈ S : ws (p) ≥ ws (q)} .
which corresponds to the random expected utility model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
(Notice that the second equality holds by the ergodic theorem.)
Example 2 illustrates the fact that when the aggregator is standard, the analyst does not
need to model repetition explicitly. For instance, repetition can be delayed for an arbitrary
number of periods without affecting stochastic choice. More generally, the agent’s long-run
choice frequency is the same regardless of how often choices are repeated, that is, stochastic
20 For instance in Hotz and Miller (1993), similar formulas are used for the computation of conditional
choice probabilities which are then used to estimate value functions for identifying parameters of interest.
This methodological approach is now commonly used in the literature.
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choice is independent of future continuation menus. As we will see in Section 4, this is no
longer true once we move away from standard utilities.
Standard utility also corresponds to the classic model in dynamic discrete choice. In that
literature, an agent’s utility satisfies
ust (c, z) = (1− β) (w (c) + εst (c, z)) + βEst
[
sup
p∈z
ust+1 (p)
]
, (5)
where the shocks ε are i.i.d. across both consumption c and continuation menus z. This
model (5) coincides with our model under standard utility when the continuation menu is
the same across different choice options, as in the example in Section 3.4 as well as typical
dynamic discrete choice problems.
To see how, note that when the continuation menu is the same, we can suppress the
dependency of the shocks on continuation menus. As a result, we can rewrite the shock
εs (c, z) simply as εs (c). We can then express the sum of current consumption utility w
and the shock εs as a new current consumption utility ws where ws (c) := w (c) + εs (c). As
a result, model (5) coincides with our model with a standard utility process. In this way,
we can consider extensions of typical models in dynamic discrete choice to allow for more
general intertemporal preferences such as Epstein-Zin.21
2.5 Identification and Uniqueness
Given an ergodic representation, Theorem 1 below shows that the analyst can completely
identify the agent’s utility process from stochastic choice. In other words, the analyst does
not require the full time series of choices for identification. Moreover, this can be done by
focusing only on repeated binary menus.
Theorem 1. Let ρ and ρ′ be represented by (P, φ) and (P ′, φ′) respectively. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) ρ (p, q) = ρ′ (p, q) for all p, q ∈ z ∈ Z∗.
(ii) (P, φ) and (P ′, φ′) generate the same utility process.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
21 One difference is that utilities in our model are bounded and Lipschitz continuous which would not be
technically satisfied if shocks are extreme-value distributed. However, if we consider only a finite subset of
choice options which is the case in most applications, then our conditions can be satisfied without loss of
generality.
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Note that Theorem 1 does not mean that the Markov process on S can be identified
uniquely; nonuniqueness can be trivially obtained by relabeling or adding redundant states.
Nevertheless, if we focus on a “minimal” state space such that no two states have the same
utility, then unique identification holds.
Given that stochastic choice data consist of only long-run frequencies, one may wonder
how it would be possible to identify the agent’s utility process completely beyond its station-
ary distribution. To see how this is possible, consider two different utility processes where
one is i.i.d. and the other exhibits persistence but both have the same stationary distri-
bution. Since the agent’s utility also encodes information about his expectation regarding
tomorrow’s utilities, the analyst can distinguish between the two processes via the agent’s
attitudes toward continuation menus. Intuitively, in the i.i.d. case, tomorrow’s utilities are
more dispersed than in the persistent case so the agent would exhibit a greater preference
for larger menus in the i.i.d. case than in the persistent case.
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3 Applications
We now demonstrate how the failure to take into account the agent’s intertemporal pref-
erences in stochastic choice models will lead to estimates and inferences that are biased.
We present three applications. The first and the second applications involve eliciting risk
aversion under Epstein-Zin preferences. The third application involves inferences in a simple
two-period dynamic discrete choice example.
3.1 Stochastic Epstein-Zin
In all three applications, we apply our model to the widely used intertemporal preferences of
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). We consider the case where Epstein-Zin preferences
are stochastic at every period.
Definition. A utility process is stochastic Epstein-Zin if there are RRAs 6= 1, ψs < 1, and
βs ∈ (0, 1) such that a.s.
φs (c, v) =
(
(1− βs) c
1−ψs + βsv
1−ψs
1−RRAs
) 1−RRAs
1−ψs
. (6)
If ρ is ergodic with a stochastic Epstein-Zin utility process, then we say ρ is stochastic
Epstein-Zin. In a stochastic Epstein-Zin utility process, each realized utility function is
characterized by three stochastic parameters: (i) the relative risk aversion RRA, (ii) the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution EIS = ψ−1, and (iii) the discount rate β. Since EIS
captures how the agent is willing to shift consumption across periods in response to changes
in interest rates, its reciprocal ψ = EIS−1 can be interpretedas the agent’s preference for
consumption smoothing.22
Couple of remarks about the functional form are in order. First, a useful special case is
when ψ = RRA, in which case the model reduces to random utility with constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA). Second, following Epstein and Zin (1989), we are assuming RRAs 6= 1
for simplicity. Third, when RRAs is larger than 1, the function is decreasing with c. This
issue can be fixed by dividing the utility function by 1−RRAs, as CRRA utility function is
22 One simple case is when the subjective state space itself is s = (RRA,EIS, β). Note that this is
not without loss of generality, since utilities encode not only intertemporal preferences (in the form of the
stochastic aggregator) but also the agent’s expectations regarding tomorrow’s state. The allowable subjective
state space can thus be much richer than the three parameters (RRA,EIS, β).
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often divided by 1− RRAs for the case when RRAs > 1.
23
Note that ψ = RRA is the only case when the agent is indifferent to the timing of the
resolution of uncertainty. The followings are extensions of the classic definitions of preference
for early or late resolution of uncertainty in our repeated choice setup.
Definition. ρ satisfies Preference for Early Resolution of Uncertainty (PEU) if for all α ∈
[0, 1],
ρ
(
αδ(c,z) + (1− α) δ(c,y), δ(c,αz+(1−α)y)
)
= 1.
ρ satisfies Preference for Late Resolution of Uncertainty (PLU) if for all α ∈ [0, 1],
ρ
(
δ(c,αz+(1−α)y), αδ(c,z) + (1− α) δ(c,y)
)
= 1.
It is well known that PEU corresponds to ψ ≤ RRA and PLU corresponds to ψ ≥ RRA
(see Epstein et al. (2014) for recent discussions on the relationship between Epstein-Zin
preferences and preferences regarding the timing of resolution of uncertainty). This naturally
extends to our setup as well.
Corollary 1. Suppose ρ is stochastic Epstein-Zin.
• Then ρ satisfies PEU if and only if a.s. ψs ≤ RRAs.
• Then ρ satisfies PLU if and only if a.s. ψs ≥ RRAs.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 4 in Section 4. 
3.2 Delayed Repetition
In the first application, we show how the proper modeling of repeated menus is important
when the agent’s utility process is stochastic Epstein-Zin. Consider Example 1, in which
the analyst is eliciting the risk aversion of an agent by repeatedly offering him the choice
between a safe option b that yields $3 for sure and a risky option r that yields $10 and $3
with equal probability. In that example, repetition is modeled explicitly as occurring every
period. On the other hand, in most models of stochastic choice (e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer
(2006)), repetition is not modeled explicitly. In the following, we will show how ignoring
repetition in stochastic choice models would lead to estimates and inferences that are biased.
23The general functional form allowing RRAs > 1 is
((1− βs)c
1−ψs + βsv
1−ψs
1−RRAs )
1−RRAs
1−ψs − 1
1−RRAs
.
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To demonstrate the importance of modeling repetition, suppose we elicited choice every
two periods instead of one. We show that this seemingly innocuous change in the repetition
frequency will change the agent’s stochastic choice significantly. Denote this delayed repeated
menu as z+1. Let b+1 ∈ z+1 denote the delayed safe option which yields $3 today, $0
tomorrow, and the repeated menu z+1 on the day after. Let r+1 denote the delayed risky
option which yields $10 and $3 with equal probability today, $0 tomorrow, and the repeated
menu z+1 on the day after. We call z+1 = {b+1, r+1} “the menu z delayed by 1 period”.
We can generalize this concept of delayed repetition to any finite number of time periods.
Given a 1-period menu z ∈ Z∗ and t ∈ T , let z+t denote the menu obtained by delaying
repeated choice by t periods. Intuitively, for every p ∈ z, p+t ∈ z+t can be expressed as
follows:
p+t =

pM , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
; z+t

 ,
where pM ∈ ∆M is the marginal distribution of p over M . That is, the delayed lottery p
+t
yields the same marginals over todays consumption as the original lottery p; but pt gives
zero consumption for t-periods and repeated menu z+t on the period after. Note that z+t
is t + 1-period. The following result shows that when the agent’s desire for consumption
smoothing (i.e., ψ) is less (more) than risk aversion (i.e.,RRA), the probability that a safe
option is chosen increases (resp., decreases) under delay.24
Proposition 1. Suppose ρ is stochastic Epstein-Zin with constant β. For any 1-period menu
z, if δ(c,z) ∈ Z for some c ∈M , then
(i) ψs ≤ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≤ ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
; moreover, ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
increases as t
increases.25
(ii) ψs ≥ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≥ ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
; moreover, ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,)
)
decreases as t
increases.
Proof. Fix any t and t′ such that t > t′. First we will show that if ψs ≤ RRAs a.s., then
24 For convenience, we present Proposition 1 in its weak form but it also holds with strictness. That is, if
ψs < RRAs holds with some probability implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
< ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
.
25The δ+t(c,z) denotes an option of δ(c,z) delayed by t periods. The option also can be written as δ(c,0....,0;z+t).
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ρz+t′
(
δ+t
′
(c,z)
)
≤ ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
. Consider outcome (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
; z+t). Fix s ∈ S. Note that
vs
(
z+t
′
)
= Es
[
max
q∈z+t′
us′ (q)
]
≥ Es
[
us′
(
δ(0,...,0 ; z+t)
)]
= vs
(
{δ(0,...,0 ; z+t)}
)
.
Let v2 = vs
(
{δ(0,...,0 ; z+t)}
)
and v1 = vs
(
z+t
′
)
so v2 ≤ v1. Define
σs :=
1− ψs
1− RRAs
.
Since φs (c, v2)
σs − βsv
σs
2 = (1− βs) c
1−ψs , we have
φs (c, v1) = f (φs (c, v2)) ,
where f(x) = (xσs + βs (v
σs
1 − v
σs
2 ))
σ−1s .
Now, if RRAs < 1, then σs ≥ 1 as ψs ≤ RRAs. On the other hand, if RRAs > 1, then
σs < 0 as ψs < 1. In either case, the function f is convex.
26 In either case, this means that
φs (·, v1) is more convex than φs (·, v2) so φs (·, v2) is more risk-averse than φs (·, v1).
For every q ∈ z, let q+t
′
M , q
+t
M ∈ ∆(M) be the marginal distributions of q
+t′ and q+t over
M , respectively. Since q+t
′
M = q
+t
M , if
us
(
δ+t
′
(c,z)
)
= φs (c, v1) ≥
∫
M
φs (c
′, v1) dq
+t′
M = us
(
q+t
′
)
.
then
us
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
= φs (c, v2) ≥
∫
M
φs (c
′, v2) dq
+t
M = us
(
q+t
)
.
Thus, the statement (i) follows. The proof of the statement (ii) (i.e., the case for ψs ≥ RRAs
a.s.) is analogous. 
To understand the implication of Proposition 1, consider Example 1. In that example, the
menu z contains only two options, the safe option and the risky option. Consider an agent
whose desire for consumption smoothing is always smaller than his relative risk aversion
(i.e., ψs ≤ RRAs a.s.). Notice that Proposition 1 implies that the probability of choosing
the risky option increases when repetition becomes more frequent (i.e., the delay +t becomes
smaller). This result can be understood intuitively as follows: under repeated choice the risky
option feels “safer” because even if today’s outcome is bad, there is always a chance that
26To see this notice that the function f is well defined if xσs + βs (v
σs
1 − v
σs
2 ) ≥ 0. Note also that f
′′(x) =
−β(1−σs)(v
σ1
1 −v
σ2
2 )x
σ−2 (xσs + βs (v
σs
1 − v
σs
2 ))
−2+ 1
σs ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0 if and only if (1−σs)(v
σ1
1 −v
σ2
2 ) ≤ 0.
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tomorrow’s outcome will be good. It is true that by choosing the risky option, the agent’s
consumption can be very non-smooth one such as the cycle of the good outcome and the bad
outcome. Whenever the agent’s preference for consumption smoothing is low compared to
his risk aversion, however, the risky option becomes more attractive as repetition becomes
more frequent. 27
This behavior may be natural in our daily life; for instance, a consumer may choose more
“risky” brands if he knows he will visit the grocery store every day but stick to “safer” brands
if he can visit the store only seldom. In fact, by conducting animal experiments, Hayden and
Platt (2007) found that rhesus macaques exhibit this behavior. A static model of stochastic
choice that ignores repetition would fail to capture such behavioral phenomena.
Couple of remarks are in order. First, notice that Proposition 1 assumes that when
repetition is delayed, the agent receives zero (i.e., the lowest) consumption in the interim
periods when there is no choice. Although this is a natural assumption, one may wonder
what would happen if the agent receives the highest consumption in those periods. In this
case, our results would be flipped.28 This does not change our general conclusion that if the
agent has nonstandard preferences, then his stochastic choice is sensitive to the change of
continuation menus.
Secondly, note also that in the special case in which ψ = RRA a.s., statement (i) and
(ii) imply ρz = ρz+t and, hence, repetition does not matter. In this case, any inference from
a static model that ignores repetition would be correct. For this reason, there is an implicit
assumption in static models of stochastic choice that the agent’s intertemporal preferences
are standard. In general, whenever intertemporal preferences are non-standard, there will
always be some biases in estimation. We formally show this in Section 4.
Finally, in this section, we study the effect of delaying consumption as a simple example
of changing continuation menus. Our point is that even this seemingly minor change of
continuation menus could affect the agent’s stochastic choice in a systematic way. Of course
there are many other ways stochastic choice can be affected by continuation menus. We
study the general case in Section 4.
27 Another example is when people would be willing to bet on a repeated lottery but not on a one-time
lottery as in the well-known Law of Large Numbers fallacy of Samuelson (1963).
28 That is, in Epstein-Zin preferences, if the agent’s risk aversion is higher (lower) than his desire for
consumption smoothing, ignoring his preferences leads to overestimation (resp. underestimation) of risk-
aversion.
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3.3 Biased Estimation
In this second application, we show how ignoring the agent’s nonstandard preferences (i.e.,
Epstein-Zin preferences) or the intertemporal structure of repeated choice would lead to sys-
tematic biases in the estimation of the agent’s risk aversion. Consider the setup in Proposi-
tion 1. First, notice that if the agent’s utility process is standard, then the probability that
the agent will choose a safe option δ(c,z) is given by
pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (c) ≥ ws(pM) for any p ∈ Z
}
, (7)
where ws(c) = c
1−RRAs is a CRRA utility function and ws(pM) = EpM [ws(c
′)] is the expected
utility of marginal lottery pM over today’s consumption. Notice also that (7) is also the
probability that the agent choses the safe option in static stochastic choice model. Remember
that in the conventional literature of single agent’s stochastic choice, researchers consider
only static models and ignore the dynamic structure of the repeated choice.
Corollary 2. Suppose ρ is stochastic Epstein-Zin with constant β. For any 1-period menu
z, if δ(c,z) ∈ Z for some c ∈M , then
(i) ψs ≤ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≤ pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (c) ≥ ws(pM) for any p ∈ Z
}
;
(ii) ψs ≥ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≥ pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (c) ≥ ws(pM) for any p ∈ Z
}
.
Proof. By Proposition 1, when ψs ≤ RRAs a.s., we get ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≤ ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
for any t.
By making the delay t arbitrarily long, we can set the value of continuation menus arbitrarily
small. That is, as t→∞, vs(z
+t)→ 0 for any s ∈ S; hence, Es[vs′(z
+t)]→ 0 for any s ∈ S.
Since φs(c, v)→ ws (c) as v → 0, we have
limt→∞ ρz+t
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
= limt→∞ pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣φs(c,Es[vs′(z+t)]) ≥ φs(p+M ,Es[vs′(z+t)]) for any p ∈ Z+t
}
= pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (c) ≥ ws(pM) for any p ∈ Z
}
,
(8)
where φs
(
pM ,Es[vs′(z)]
)
≡ EpMφs
(
c′,Es[vs′(z)]
)
and the first equality holds by the ergodic
theorem. The last equation holds because the marginal distributions of p and p+t on M are
the same. Hence, statement (i) holds. We can show statement (ii) similarly. 
The right-hand side of the equations in Corollary 2 is the stochastic choice of an agent
with standard CRRA utility, which exactly coincides with the static distribution of risk
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aversion. In other words, it is the probability that the agent choose the safe option in
the static choice. The inequality implies that an analyst who incorrectly assumes standard
intertemporal preferences would underestimate the agent’s risk aversion if the agent in fact
has Epstein-Zin preferences with ψ ≤ RRA. In other words, the analyst may incorrectly
conclude that the agent is mostly risk-loving, while in reality, he is risk-averse a.s. but
chooses the safe option infrequently due to intertemporal preferences.
Admittedly, it is unsurprising that the use of a misspecified model would lead to biased
estimates. But the importance of Corollary 2 is that it demonstrates a systematic and tight
pattern within which estimates would be biased. In Epstein-Zin preferences, if the agent’s
risk aversion is higher (resp., lower) than his desire for consumption smoothing, ignoring his
preferences leads to underestimation (resp., overestimation) of risk aversion.
Corollary 2 holds in strict form as Proposition 1. That is, if ψs < RRAs holds with some
probability, then ρz(δ(c,z)) < pi{s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws(c) ≥ ws(pM) for any p ∈ Z}. In empirical analysis,
however, the size of biases matters. To get a sense of how big the biases can be, in the
following we apply Corollary 2 to Example 1 by letting z be the set of the safe option and
the risky option. That is, z = {b, r}, where b ≡ δ(3,z) and r ≡
1
2
δ(10,z) +
1
2
δ(0,z).
First, notice that under the incorrect assumption that the agent’s utility process is stan-
dard, the probability (7) that the agent will choose a safe option δ(3,z) becomes
pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (3) ≥ 12ws (10) + 12ws (0)
}
.
The true probability that the safe option is chosen under the correct specification of Epstein-
Zin preferences is given by
ρz(δ(3,z)) = pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣φs(3,Es[vs′(z)]) > 12φs
(
10,Es[vs′(z)]
)
+
1
2
φs
(
0,Es[vs′(z)]
)}
, (9)
where
vs(z) = max
{
φs
(
3,Es[vs′(z)]
)
,
1
2
φs
(
10,Es[vs′(z)]
))
+
1
2
φs
(
0,Es[vs′(z)]
))}
. (10)
Proposition 2. Suppose ρ is stochastic Epstein-Zin with β = .9. Let z be the 1-period menu
in Example 1. If RRAs follows the uniform distribution over [.5, .97]
29 and ψs independently
29We set the upper bound of RRA to be strictly less than 1, or 0.97. This is because when RRA becomes
too close to 1, the power (1 − ψ)/(1 − RRA) of the future value in an Epstein-Zin preference tends to be
infinity and it becomes difficult to calculate the value correctly by using computers. When we set the upper
bound to be exactly 1, the values of both the safe option and the risky option blow up and computers will
23
follows the uniform distribution over [0, .5], then
ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
≤ .2 < 1 = pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (3) ≥ 12ws (10) + 12ws (0)
}
. (11)
Proof. Under the assumptions of the distributions, it is easy to calculate the value of
pi
{
s ∈ S
∣∣∣∣ws (3) ≥ 12ws (10) + 12ws (0)
}
. We obtain the value of ρz(δ(3,z)) by solving the Bell-
man equation (10). It can be shown that if ψs < RRAs < 1, then φs(c, ·) is a contraction
mapping for a given c. Thus, we can solve the Bellman equation to explicitly calculate the
continuation value vs(z) at each state s. Given the continuation values, we can calculate the
value of ρz(δ(3,z)) by using (9) under the assumptions of the distributions. 
The size of biases
(
i.e., the difference between pi{s ∈ S|ws (3) ≥
1
2
ws (10) +
1
2
ws (0)}
and ρz
(
δ(3,z)
))
is significant in this proposition: The agent is significantly risk-averse (i.e.,
RRAs ≥ .5 a.s.) and should not choose the risky option over the safe option in the static
choice between the two options. In repeated choice, however, the agent chooses the risky
option more than 80 percent of the time due to intertemporal considerations. Thus, if
the analyst either misspecifies the agent’s preferences as standard or ignores intertemporal
aspects of the agent’s choice would underestimate his risk aversion. Notice that Proposition
2 is consistent with statement (i) of Corollary 2 since RRAs > ψs a.s.
Our conclusion that the size of the biases is significant does not change across various
values of β and various distributions. First, we assigned β the values of .99, .9, .8, and .7.
For all of the cases, we find that the agent should not choose the risky option in the static
choice; while in repeated choice the agent chooses the risky option more than 75 percent of
the time due to intertemporal considerations.30 In particular, when β = .99, .9, .8, and .7,
the values of ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
are .1558, .1779, .2090, and .2484, respectively. It is interesting to
see that ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
increases as β decreases. This is because as β decreases, the future value
decreases: hence φs(·, v) becomes more concave. Notice that this sensitivity of the result to
the discount factor does not arise for the case of standard utility.
Second, we changed the distributions of RRA and ψ by keeping the independence as-
sumption and the support of the distributions (i.e., the support for the distribution of RRA
is [.5, .97] and the support for the distribution of ψ is [0, .5]). We used (i) binomial distri-
bution and (ii) beta distributions with different parameters. For all distributions that we
incorrectly conclude that the two values are the same.
30ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
≤ .25 and pi{s ∈ S|ws (3) ≥
1
2ws (10) +
1
2ws (0)} = 1 for all β.
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used, the agent chooses the risky option at least about half of the time in repeated choice,
although the agent should not choose the risky option in the static choice at all. In par-
ticular, when the distributions of RRA and ψ are both beta distributions with parameters
(2, 2), (.5, .5), (1, 3), and (3, 1), the values of ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
are .0887, .2699, .0051, and .4763, re-
spectively. When the distributions of RRA and ψ are binomial distributions with parameter
.5, the agent chooses the risky option almost always in repeated choice, although the agent
should not choose the risky option in the static choice at all. Moreover, we relaxed the inde-
pendence assumption; when the joint distribution is the uniform distribution over (ψ,RRA)
such that 0 ≤ ψ < RRA ≤ .97, the agent chooses the risky option about 68 percent of the
time in the repeated choice, although he chooses the risky option only about 20 percent in
the static choice.31
Finally, while it may be possible to obtain a qualitative result similar to Corollary 2
while assuming deterministic Epstein-Zin preferences, the importance of our analysis is that
it provides a framework to assess the quantitative degree of bias in estimations such as
Proposition 2. This is useful especially for dynamic discrete-choice models in which agents
receive preference shocks over time. To the best of our knowledge, no such result–even a
qualitative result–has appeared in the literature.32
3.4 Dynamic Discrete Choice
In the last application, we apply our model to a simple two-period dynamic discrete choice
example to illustrate the effects of intertemporal preferences on inference. The purpose of
this application is to illustrate how our model can be readily applied to problems of discrete
choice estimation that allow for more general temporal preferences.
Following most applications in dynamic discrete choice, we adopt the population interpre-
tation of stochastic choice in this subsection only. In other words, we consider a population
of observationally identical agents facing the same choice problem. This is possible in our
model under two assumptions. First, even though choices are not technically repeated (we
consider only two periods), we can model this as the limit of delaying repetition for an
arbitrarily number of periods (see Section 3.2). Second, we assume the state follows an
31In this case, ρz
(
δ(3,z)
)
= .8062 and pi{s ∈ S|ws (3) ≥
1
2ws (10) +
1
2ws (0)} = .3255.
32 Epstein-Zin preferences have been widely used to resolve the equity premium puzzle in macro-finance.
Those results, however, rely on equilibrium arguments that are intrinsically different from the analysis in
Proposition 2.
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i.i.d. process where the distribution of each agent’s state tomorrow is exactly equal to the
population distribution pi.33 Under these assumptions, the long-run choice frequency that
corresponds to stochastic choice also reflects the population choice. We can thus reinterpret
stochastic choice in our ergodic model as a result of unobserved heterogeneity in a population
of agents. The latter assumption is a typical assumption when estimating conditional choice
probabilities in the dynamic discrete choice literature (see Hotz and Miller (1993)).
The setup is as follows. There is a population of agents who decide whether to purchase
phone insurance (e.g., AppleCare) at the beginning of years 1 and 2. We are interested in
modeling their choice of insurance. Let cs be the annual consumption value of the phone
for an agent at state s ∈ S. We assume s is i.i.d. with stationary distribution pi, which is
also the population distribution of s. The price of insurance is a. In year t ∈ {1, 2}, there
is pt probability that the phone breaks down, in which case an agent’s estimated cost for
fixing a broken phone is θs. Both the consumer and the analyst know a, p1, and p2. Only
the consumer knows the repair cost θs; the analyst would like to estimate the distribution
of θs. For simplicity, we assume that cs ≥ a and cs ≥ θs so all agents have positive final
consumption. Note that in contrast to the application in the previous sections, utilities
in this example appear stochastic to the analyst due to unobserved heterogeneity in the
population (e.g., each agent’s repair cost).
First, consider the case where all agents have risk-neutral standard preferences (i.e.,
stochastic Epstein-Zin from (6) with RAAs = ψs = 0). We study whether agents choose to
buy insurance in year 1. Let βs be the discount rate and v denote an agent’s continuation
value.34 An agent will choose insurance if the following holds:
(1− βs) (cs − a) + βsv ≥ p1 ((1− βs) (cs − θs) + βsv) + (1− p1) ((1− βs)cs + βsv) ,
or, equivalently, θs ≥ a/p1. If we let b denote the “buy insurance” option, r denote the “not
buy insurance” option and z = {b, r} denote the menu, then the probability that insurance
is purchased is given by
ρ∗z (b) = pi {s ∈ S : θs ≥ a/p1} . (12)
Naturally, lower values of θs correspond to fewer agents choosing insurance.
Next, we consider the case where all agents have non-standard preferences. For instance,
33 We can relax this assumption as long as the stationary distribution of the (possibly non-i.i.d.) state
process is the same as the population distribution.
34 This is the same for all agents since the distribution of next period’s state is pi for everyone.
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suppose the utility of an agent in state s ∈ S is given by stochastic Epstein-Zin with risk
neutrality (i.e., RAAs = 0):
φs (c, v) =
(
(1− βs)c
1−ψs + βsv
1−ψs
) 1
1−ψs , (13)
where ψs captures the agent’s desire for consumption smoothing as in the previous subsection.
Note that when the continuation value v is zero, this reduces to standard risk-neutral utility.
Now, the probability that insurance is chosen is given by
ρz (b) = pi {s ∈ S : φs (cs − a, v) ≥ p1φs (cs − θs, v) + (1− p1)φs (cs, v)} , (14)
where
v :=
∫
S
max {φs (b
′) , φs (r
′)} dpi
is the value of the continuation menu z′ = {b′, r′}, where b′ and r′ correspond to purchasing
insurance or not respectively.
We now demonstrate how ignoring intertemporal preferences would lead to biased es-
timation of θs in this dynamic discrete choice problem. Suppose that agents’ utilities are
non-standard and given by equation (13) and, hence, the insurance adoption rate is given
by ρz (p) from equation (14). The analyst however misspecifies the model and assumes that
utilities are standard. In this misspecified model, the insurance adoption rate is given by
ρ∗z(p) from equation (12). The following proposition characterizes the comparison between
ρ∗z(p) and ρz(p) depending on the agents’ intertemporal preferences.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ρ∗ and ρ are given as in equations (12) and (14), respectively.
(i) ψs ≤ 0 (i.e. RRAs) a.s. implies ρz (p) ≤ ρ
∗
z (p).
(ii) ψs ≥ 0 (i.e. RRAs) a.s. implies ρz (p) ≥ ρ
∗
z (p).
Proof. Note that φs (·, v) is convex if ψs ≤ 0 . Thus, φs (·, v) is risk-loving so
φs (cs − a, v) ≥ p1φs (cs − θs, v) + (1− p1)φs (cs, v)
implies cs − a ≥ p1 (cs − θs) + (1− p1) cs. This means that ρz (p) ≤ ρ
∗
z (p) as desired. The
case for ψs ≥ 0 is symmetric. 
Proposition 3 implies that if ψs is negative for almost all agents, then ignoring intertem-
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poral preferences will result in underestimation of repair costs.35 To see this, note that the
analyst misinterprets the observed adoption rate ρz(p) as ρ
∗
z(p) and will estimate θs based
on the misspecified model (12). Proposition 3 shows that ρz (p) ≤ ρ
∗
z (p) when ψs is negative
a.s. This means that if the analyst observes a low adoption rate, she would incorrectly infer
that repair costs are low.36 In reality however, agents are more willing to decline insurance
due to their intertemporal preferences. The implication for when ψs is positive for almost
all agents is symmetric.
For an intuitive understanding of why Proposition 3 holds, recall Corollary 2 and Propo-
sition 2. Note that buying (not buying) insurance in Proposition 3 corresponds to choosing
the safe option (resp., the risky option) in Corollary 2 and Proposition 2. This is because if
agents purchase insurance, their payoffs are constant. Note also that assuming the standard
model corresponds to delaying forever (i.e., ρ∗z = ρz+∞). Therefore, under the assumption of
risk neutrality (i.e., RAA = 0), statements (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 correspond respec-
tively to statements (i) and (ii) in Corollary 2 (i.e., Proposition 2 with infinite delay (i.e.,
t =∞)). The reasoning for Proposition 3 then follows as in Corollary 2 and Proposition 2.
This example illustrates how our model can be readily applied to problems of discrete
choice estimation that allow for more general temporal preferences. Although we assumed
risk neutrality for simplicity, this example can be easily generalized to accommodate non-
trivial risk attitudes. Our example is straightforward but it serves to illustrate the inherent
inference issues that can arise if intertemporal preferences are not taken into account in
many applications of dynamic discrete choice estimation. While ignoring intertemporal pref-
erences would obviously affect inference, our main point is understanding the systematic way
in which intertemporal preferences affect estimation as outlined in Proposition 3.
We conclude this section by explaining how to incorporate additive shocks widely used
in the dynamic discrete choice literature. With additive errors εs, the utility if the phone
breaks is given by
us (cs − θs, z) = φs (cs − θs + εs (cs − θs) , vs (z)) ,
where θs is the repair cost. The same argument for Proposition 3 then applies in this setting.
If ψs is negative for almost all agents, then ignoring intertemporal preferences will result in
35 Since we are considering risk-neutral agents (RRAs = 0), ψs is negative corresponds to preference for
early resolution of uncertainty.
36 Recall that a lower adoption rate corresponds to lower values of θs from equation (12).
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underestimation of repair costs. Vice-versa, if ψs is positive for almost all agents, then
ignoring intertemporal preferences will result in overestimation of repair costs.
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4 Intertemporal Preferences
4.1 Independence of Continuation Menus
In Section 3, we demonstrated how the explicit modeling of repeated choice is paramount for
an analyst interested in elicitation or inference when the agent has non-standard intertem-
poral preferences. In this section, we formalize when repeated choice needs to be taken into
account by the analyst versus when it is unnecessary to do so as in static random choice. In
the case of the latter, we say the stochastic choice satisfies an axiom called Independence of
Continuation Menus.
To illustrate, recall Example 1 where the menu consists of a risky option that yields
$10 and $0 with equal probability and a safe option that yields $3 for sure. Proposition 1
implies that the probability of choosing the risky option over the safe option depends on the
timing of the next repetition; in other words, continuation menus matter unless the agent
is indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty. On the other hand, in Example 2
where we assume standard utility, the only thing that matters is the distribution of current
consumption; in that case, choice is independent of continuation menus.
We now formalize these concepts. Fix a menu z ∈ Z and for every p ∈ z, let pZ ∈ ∆Z
denote the distributions of next-period continuation menus. Given a menu z, suppose pZ =
qZ for all p, q ∈ z so the distribution of the agent’s next-period continuation menu is the
same regardless of what the agent chooses. We call such a menu 1-period invariant.37
The following definition characterizes when choice is independent of next-period contin-
uation menus. To introduce the definition, for any menu z ∈ Z and for every p ∈ z, let
pM ∈ ∆M denote the distributions of current consumption and let
zM := {pM ∈ ∆M : p ∈ z}
denote the menu of consumption distributions.
Consider a menu z where pZ = r for all p ∈ z so z is 1-period invariant. Now, construct
another menu from z by switching the distribution of next-period menus from r to r′ but
leaving the distribution of current consumption the same. Call this new menu y. In other
words, zM = yM and qZ = r
′ for all q ∈ y. Note that both z and y are 1-period invariant.
1-Period Independence of Continuation Menus states that choice probabilities in y and z
37 Note that every 1-period menu is 1-period invariant. The converse is not true.
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are the same; in other words, switching the common distribution of next-period menus does
not alter stochastic choice.
Definition. ρ satisfies 1-Period Independence of Continuation Menus (1-ICM) if for all
1-period invariant z, y ∈ Z∗, p ∈ z and q ∈ y,
pM = qM and zM = yM =⇒ ρz (p) = ρy (q) .
Under 1-ICM, the agent evaluates current consumption independent of next-period con-
tinuation menus. In fact, it implies the separability axiom of Frick et al. (2018) which is
the stochastic analog of the standard separability axiom of Fishburn (1970). This follows
from the fact when current consumption is evaluated independent of next-period continua-
tion menus, the agent will naturally ignore correlations between current consumption and
next-period menus.
1-ICM is applicable only to menus that are 1-period invariant. This is the case in Propo-
sition 1 where z is 1 period and y = z+t for some t so zM = yM .
38 In general however, we
may consider menus that are not 1-period invariant. Suppose the analyst is interested in
eliciting the agent’s discount factor. In order to do this, she would need to offer repeated
menus of at least 2 periods.39
We now extend our notion of independence beyond the first period. For simplicity, we
will focus on menus such that every continuation menu before time t is degenerate. We call
such menus t-simple. For every option in a t-simple menu, we can consider its distributions
over t-period consumptions and continuation menus. Formally, letM1 :=M , and recursively
define Mt := M ×∆Mt−1. Let pMt ∈ ∆Mt denote the t-period distribution of consumption
and let
zMt := {pMt ∈ ∆Mt : p ∈ z}
denote the menu of t-period consumption distributions. Also let pZt ∈ ∆(∆ (· · ·∆Z)) denote
the t-period distribution of continuation menus where the ∆ (·) operator is applied t times.
38In Proposition 1, note that for all p ∈ z, pZ = δz while for all q ∈ y, qZ = δ(0,...,y) which corresponds to
0 consumption for t periods followed by y. Hence, both y and z are 1-period invariant. Proposition 1 implies
that if ψs = RRAs a.s., then ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
= ρzt
(
δ+t(c,z)
)
which agrees exactly with 1-ICM.
39For instance, let p correspond to an early option of consuming $10 today and q correspond to a later
option of consuming $15 tomorrow. Let z = {p, q} where p = (10, 0; z) and q = (0, 15; z). In this case,
pZ = δ(0,z) 6= δ(15,z) = qZ so z is not 1-period invariant. As a result, 1-ICM no longer applies.
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Given a menu z, if pZt = qZt for all p, q ∈ z, then the menu is t-period invariant.
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The next definition characterizes when choice is independent of all continuation menus. It
extends 1-ICM from one period to t periods. Similar to the reasoning for 1-ICM, ICM implies
that switching the common distribution of continuation menus does not alter stochastic
choice.
Definition. ρ satisfies t-Period Independence of Continuation Menus (t-ICM) if for all t-
period invariant z, y ∈ Z∗, p ∈ z and q ∈ y,
pMt = qMt and zMt = yMt =⇒ ρz (p) = ρy (q) .
Moreover, ρ satisfies Independence of Continuation Menus (ICM) if it satisfies t-ICM for all
t ∈ T .
In the following, we characterize utility processes that satisfy ICM. First, consider the
following class of additively separable utility processes.
Definition. A utility process is additively separable if there is a random vNM utility ws, a
random function ϕs and a random discount factor βs such that a.s.
φs (c, v) = (1− βs)ws (c) + βsϕs (v) .
Note that an additively separable utility process is standard if and only if ϕs (v) = v a.s.
The main result of this section shows that 1-ICM exactly characterizes additively separa-
ble utility while ICM exactly characterizes standard utility. As mentioned, standard utility
has been widely assumed in dynamic discrete choice analysis.41
Theorem 2. Suppose ρ is ergodic. Then,
(i) it satisfies ICM if and only if its utility process is standard.
(ii) it satisfies 1-ICM if and only if its utility process is additively separable.
(iii) it satisfies ICM if and only if it satisfies 1-ICM and 2-ICM.
Proof. See Appendix E.1. 
40 As in 1-period menus, every simple t-period menu is t-period invariant but the converse is not true.
41 It corresponds to an infinite-horizon Markovian version of the Bayesian Evolving Utility model of Frick
et al. (2018).
32
While it may not be surprising that standard utility ensures ICM, Theorem 2 (i) in-
terestingly shows that ICM implies standard utility. In other words, whenever the agent
has non-standard intertemporal preferences (i.e., non-standard utility), there exists some
repeated choice problem where continuation menus matter; ignoring repeated choice in such
a problem would result in biased inference. Remember that standard utility was exactly the
case assumed in Example 2 where our ergodic model reduces to the static model of random
expected utility.
Theorem 2 (ii) and (iii) show that while the additive separability is sufficient to ensure 1-
ICM, it is insufficient to ensure ICM. In other words, when an agent has a additively separable
utility process, the analyst can ignore repetition for 1-period menus but not 2-period ones.
4.2 Resolution of Uncertainty, Repeated Independence, and Stan-
dard Utility
In this subsection, we relate ICM with other well-studied intertemporal preferences of timing
of resolution of uncertainty. In particular, we first show that the indifference to the timing
of resolution of uncertainty is not enough to characterize ICM. We show that a repeated
version of independence axiom together with the indifference to the timing of resolution of
uncertainty characterize ICM. Given the equivalence between the standard utility model and
ICM proved in Theorem 2, this characterization has an additional important implication:
these two axioms characterize the standard utility model.
Consider the stochastic Epstein-Zin preferences of Section 3.1 and note that if the agent
satisfies Indifference to Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty (IRU) (i.e., both PEU and
PLU), then the utility process is standard (i.e., ψs = RAAs a.s.). Given Theorem 2, this
means that under stochastic Epstein-Zin preferences, IRU ensures that ICM is satisfied. For
general utility processes however, IRU does not imply ICM; it implies a stochastic version
of the classic Uzawa-Epstein preferences.
Definition. A utility process is stochastic Uzawa-Epstein if there are vNM utilities ws and
βs such that a.s.
φs (c, v) = (1− βs (c))ws (c) + βs (c) v.
Proposition 4. Suppose ρ is ergodic. Then,
(i) it satisfies PEU (PLU) if and only if φs (c, ·) is convex (resp., concave) a.s.
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(ii) it satisfies IRU if and only if its utility process is stochastic Uzawa-Epstein.
Proof. Suppose ρ exhibits PEU. We thus have a.s.
αφs (c, vs (z)) + (1− α)φs (c, vs (y)) ≥ φs (c, αvs (z) + (1− α) vs (y)) .
Since this is true for all z and y, the result follows. The case for PLU is symmetric. If φ (c, ·)
is both concave and convex, then it is linear. Thus, φs (c, v) = (1− βs (c))ws (c) + βs (c) v
for βs (c) > 0 for all c ∈M . 
Proposition 4 is the stochastic analog of Theorem 1 of Epstein (1983). Since stochastic
Uzawa-Epstein is strictly more general than the standard model, Proposition 4 implies that
IRU is too weak to ensure ICM. In fact, since Uzawa-Epstein utilities are not additively
separable, it follows from Theorem 2 (ii) that IRU will not even ensure 1-ICM. It is easy to
see this in the functional form of Uzawa-Epstein utility as the value of continuation menus
has nontrivial effects on current consumption utility via the term βs (c).
Given that IRU does not ensure ICM but ICM implies IRU (since every standard utility
satisfies IRU), it is natural to ask what additional property will bridge the gap between IRU
and ICM. It turns out to be a repeated version of classic independence axiom. To illustrate,
recall Example 1 where the 1-period menu z consists of a risky option that yields $10 and $0
with equal probability and a safe option that yields $3 for sure. Suppose we wanted to test
the independence axiom in this repeated setup by mixing both the risky and safe options
with a third option r that yields $4 for sure. Let y denote this new 50-50 mixture of z and
r. Note that y is also a 1-period menu and consists of two options: one option that yields
$10 with probability 0.25, $0 with probability 0.25, and $4 with probability 0.50; the other
option yields $3 and $4 with equal chance. Importantly, regardless of what happens, the
agent will face y for sure next period so this mixture is repeated every period ad infinitum.
We use the notation y = 0.5z 0.5r to denote this 50-50 repeated mixture between z and r.
This corresponds exactly to repeated testing of the classic independence axiom.
We now formalize this concept. First consider a 1-period menu z ∈ Z∗ in which every
p ∈ z can be expressed as (pM ; z). Consider repeatedly mixing z with some r ∈ ∆M . This
yields the new 1-period menu, denoted by αz (1− α) r ∈ Z∗, such than any element of the
1-period menu is of the form
(αpM + (1− α) r ; αz  (1− α) r) .
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In other words, every option is mixed with r every period. We denote the element of
αz (1− α) r ∈ Z∗ by αp (1− α) r. We can extend this to all t-period simple menus (see
Appendix G) and define repeated independence as follows.
Definition. ρ satisfies Repeated Independence (RI) if for all t-simple z ∈ Z∗, α > 0 and
r ∈ ∆M
ρz (p) = ραz(1−α)r (αp (1− α) r) .
RI is exactly the classic independence axiom in our repeated choice setup. In fact, it
corresponds to the linearity axiom in the static random expected utility model of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2006). The main result of this subsection shows that IRU in addition to RI
exactly characterizes ICM. Moreover, under IRU, RI is equivalent to 1-ICM.
Theorem 3. Suppose ρ is ergodic. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) it satisfies ICM.
(ii) it satisfies IRU and RI.
(iii) it satisfies IRU and 1-ICM.
(iv) the utility process is standard.
Proof. For the equivalence between (i) and (ii), see Appendix E.3. The equivalence between
(i) and (iii) follows from Theorem 2, , Proposition 4, and the fact that any additively
separable Uzawa-Epstein utility must be standard. The equivalence between (i) and (iv) is
from Theorem 2. 
As mentioned, the main result of the theorem is the equivalence between (i) and (ii);
IRU together with RI characterize ICM. The equivalence between (ii) and (iv) also would
have important implication in the literature of dynamic discrete choice given the fact that
standard utility has been assumed in the literature. As mentioned, it has been pointed out
by Rust (1994) that in the literature, a preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty
has been ignored since the standard utility implies IRU (See footnote 10). The equivalence
between (ii) and (iv), however, shows that there is yet another implication of standard utility
model, which is exactly RI.
Theorem 3 also suggests that with stochastic choice, intertemporal preferences complicate
tests of the classic independence axiom. Even though the agent may satisfy the static
independence axiom for a single time period, he may violate this repeated version of the
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independence axiom (i.e., RI). 42 Moreover, as we will show in the next section, any ergodic
ρ satisfies the independence axiom over menus (i.e., Linearity (Axiom 1.2)). These facts
show the importance of specifying the appropriate domain when we test the independence
axiom with stochastic choice.
5 Characterization
This section provides an axiomatic characterization of our model. First, we show how re-
peated menus can be used to approximate any menu. This allows us to extend our primitive
to the set of all (finite) menus.
5.1 Extending Repeated Menus
Given any menu z ∈ Z, consider replicating the menu z for the first t periods and ending
with a menu y ∈ Z for sure. We use the notation ry,t (z) to denote such a menu and construct
it inductively as follows. First, for any y ∈ Z, let ry,0 (z) = y. Given ry,t−1, for any p ∈ ∆X,
let py,t ∈ ∆X denote the lottery induced by ry,t−1, that is, for all measurable A× B,
py,t (A× B) = p
(
A× r−1y,t−1 (B)
)
.
Finally, for any z ∈ Z, define
ry,t (z) := {py,t : p ∈ z} .
In other words, ry,t (z) ∈ Z is the menu that follows z for the first t periods ending with y
for sure. Lemma 13 shows that this is well-defined.
Given any menu z ∈ Z, we can now define what it means to construct a repeated menu
that approximates z up to t periods. We let zt denote this t-period repeated version of z.
Definition. Given z ∈ Z, let zt be t-period such that zt = rzt,t (z).
The following lemma shows this is well-defined. Moreover, given any menu z ∈ Z, we
can use its t-period repeated version to approximate it as we increase the number of periods
between each repetition.
42In Appendix G, we study the relationship between non-standard intertemporal preferences and particular
patterns of RI violations along with comparative statics.
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Lemma 2. For every z ∈ Z, zt exists and zt → z as t→∞.
Proof. See Appendix F.1. 
Recall Z∗ = Zr ∩Zf where Zf is the set of finite menus. We can now use finite repeated
menus to approximate any finite menu.
Corollary 3. Z∗ is dense in Zf .
Proof. Fix some finite menu z ∈ Zf so from Lemma 2 above, we can find repeated menus
zt such that zt → z. Since zt = rzt,t (z) and z is finite, z
t is also finite by definition. Thus,
zt ∈ Z∗ as desired. 
5.2 Axiomatic Characterization
The results in the previous section allow us to extend the observed stochastic choice on
repeated finite menus to all finite menus as follows. Consider a random choice ρ¯ on all finite
menus Zf such that ρ¯z = ρz for every z ∈ Z
∗. In other words, ρ¯ agrees with ρ on all repeated
menus Z∗. From Corollary 3, we know that Z∗ is dense in Zf . Thus, for any z ∈ Zf , we can
find zt ∈ Z∗ such that zt → z. If ρ¯ is continuous, then ignoring ties,
ρ¯z = lim
t
ρzt
Thus, we can think of ρ¯ as the continuous extension of ρ from Z∗ to Zf . We model ties in
the same way as ρ (see the discussion on ties in Section 2.1) and let Z◦ ⊂ Zf denote the set
of finite menus that contain no ties. To simplify notation going forward, we let ρ denote ρ¯
without loss of generality.
We are now ready to state our axioms on stochastic choice. The first set of axioms
consists of conditions on random expected utility. Note that mixtures here are taken ex-ante
at time 0 and we let ext (z) denote the extreme options of some menu z ∈ Zf . Also recall
that x¯ and x are the consumption streams that yield the best outcome (i.e., m) and the worst
outcome (i.e., 0) respectively forever. Note that we sometimes let x denote the singleton
menu that yields consumption x ∈ X forever.
Axiom 1.1 (Monotonicity). For any z, y ∈ Zf and p ∈ z,
z ⊂ y =⇒ ρz (p) ≥ ρy (p) .
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Axiom 1.2 (Linearity). For any z ∈ Zf , α > 0, p ∈ z, and q ∈ ∆X,
ρz (p) = ραz+(1−α)q (αp+ (1− α) q) .
Axiom 1.3 (Extremeness). For any z ∈ Zf , ρz (ext (z)) = 1.
Axiom 1.4 (Continuity). ρ : Z◦ → ∆(∆X) is continuous.
Axiom 1.5 (Best-Worst). ρ (x, x¯) = 0 and ρ (x¯, x) = ρ (x, x) = 1 for all x ∈ X.
Axiom 1.6 (L-continuity). There exists N > 0 such that for any α ∈ [0, 1] and any x, x′ ∈ X,
|x− x′| ≤
α
N
=⇒ ρ
(
αδx¯ + (1− α) δx, αδx + (1− α) δx′
)
= 1.
Axioms 1.1-1.4 are direct from Gul and Pesendorfer (2006). Best-Worst (Axiom 1.5)
ensures that x¯ and x truly are the best and worst outcomes. Finally, L-continuity (Axiom
1.6) is the stochastic version of the Lipschitz continuity axiom from Dekel et al. (2007). It
guarantees that utilities are sufficiently well-behaved in that they are Lipschitz continuous
with respect to some common bound N . This is important for the representation and ensures
that it is unique.43 To understand L-continuity intuitively, note that when N = ∞, then
x1 = x2 = x for some x and the axiom reduces to
ρ
(
αδx¯ + (1− α) δx, αδx + (1− α) δx
)
= 1,
which holds by Best-Worst and Linearity. L-continuity requires that this holds for large
enough but finite N .44 Taken together, Axiom 1 characterizes a random expected Lipschitz
utility with best and worst outcomes. Continuation Linearity (Axiom 2) below ensures
that agent’s preference toward continuation menus satisfy linearity with respect to ex-post
mixing. First, we define component-wise ex-post mixing. For λ ∈ [0, 1], c, c′ ∈ M and
z, z′ ∈ Z, define ex-post mixing as
λδ(c,z) ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) := δ(λc+(1−λ)c′,λz+(1−λ)z′).
Here, the first mixture λc + (1− λ) c′ corresponds to the standard mixing of monetary
consumptions (i.e., real numbers) while the second mixture λz + (1− λ) z′ corresponds to
43 When the outcome space is infinite-dimensional, allowing for all possible vNM utilities would be too
permissive and result in identification issues.
44 Notice that if the condition is satisfied for N , then it must also be satisfied for all N ′ ≥ N so testing
the axiom involves finding a large enough N such that the condition holds.
38
Minkowski mixing of menus.45 For any c ∈ M , let Zfc be the set of finite menus such that
every option p ∈ z is degenerate and yields consumption c for sure today (i.e., p = δ(c,w) for
some w ∈ Z). For any z ∈ Zfc , define
λz ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) :=
{
λp⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) : p ∈ z
}
,
which is the Minkowski version of ex-post mixing.
Consider a lottery p in a menu z ∈ Zfc . Lets mix p and z with a pair (c
′, z′) ex post and
call them q and y, respectively (i.e., q = λp ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) and y = λz ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′)).
Then y ∈ q and the independence axiom with respect to the ex-post mixing would state that
ρz (p) = ρy (q) .
The axiom below strengthens this to independence even with respect to mixtures between z
and y.
Axiom 2 (Continuation Linearity). If p ∈ z ∈ Zfc , y = λz ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) and q = λp ⊕
(1− λ) δ(c′,z′) for c, c
′ ∈M , z′ ∈ Z and λ > 0, then
ρz (p) = ραz+(1−α)y (αp+ (1− α) q) .
The next two axioms are conditions with respect to the classic stationarity axiom orig-
inally proposed by Koopmans (1960). In classic stationarity, an agent’s choices remain
unchanged if all consumptions are delayed by the same number of time periods. Given
stochastic preferences, classic stationarity would obviously be violated. One way to extend
stationarity to a stochastic setup is to require an agent’s choice frequencies to remain un-
changed if all consumptions are delayed by the same number of time periods.46 Formally,
for any z, y ∈ Zf and c ∈M ,
ρ (z, y) = ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,y)
)
.
Classic stationarity is normatively appealing and necessary if the agent is a standard expo-
nential discounter. Stochastic stationarity retains much of the flavor of classic stationarity
45 One could only impose mixing in menus in cases where tomorrow’s consumption is the same. The same
characterization would then lead to a random utility model where the transition probabilities Ps could also
depend on the consumption each period and they all share the same stationary distribution. This could
accommodate consumption-dependent stochastic preferences such as habit formation or experimentation.
46 See Lu and Saito (2018) for a stochastic version of the stationarity axiom in a different setup.
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but allows for stochastic choice due to stochastic utilities.
However, stochastic stationarity would be violated in our model of ergodic utility. For
example, consider the standard utility process, in which the state follows an i.i.d. process
(i.e., Ps = pi for all s ∈ S). Let p correspond to the option of consuming c1 today and 0
tomorrow and q correspond to the option of consuming 0 today and c2 tomorrow. Thus,
ρ (p, q) = pi {w (c1) ≥ βs1w (c2)} ,
which depends on the distribution of the stochastic discount rate βs1. Here, the choice
between the original options depends on the realization of the agent’s stochastic discount
rate. On the other hand, if all consumption is delayed by one period, then
ρ
(
δ(c,p), δ(c,q)
)
= pi {✚✚βs1w (c1) ≥✚✚βs1δw (c2)} = pi {w (c1) ≥ δw (c2)} ,
which is not stochastic as δ = E [βs2] is deterministic. Notice here that, the choice between
the delayed options depends on the agent’s expectation of the discount rate, which is deter-
ministic in this i.i.d. example. In general, when realizations and expectations are different,
stochastic stationarity will be violated.47
Given the example above, we consider two relaxations of Stochastic Stationarity. The
first condition, Deterministic Stationarity (Axiom 3) is exactly the classic deterministic sta-
tionarity axiom of Koopmans (1960) extended to menus.48 It states that choices should
satisfy stationarity whenever they are deterministic.
Axiom 3 (Deterministic Stationarity). For any z, y ∈ Zf and c ∈M ,
ρ (z, y) = 1 ⇒ ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,y)
)
= 1.
The second condition, Average Stationarity (Axiom 4), ensures that stationarity should
be satisfied “on average”. First, for α ∈ [0, 1], define the following lottery that yields either
the best or worst prize.
pα := αδx¯ + (1− α) δx.
47 In the i.i.d. example, the discount factor for consumption at period t is given by
βs1E
[
βs2E
[
· · ·βst−1E [βst ]
]]
= βs1E [β]
t−1 = βs1δ
t−1,
where δ := E [β]. Interestingly, this particular example corresponds to a model of random quasi-hyperbolic
discounting where present bias occurs if βs1 < δ and future bias occurs if βs1 > δ.
48 It is very similar to the menu stationarity axiom of Higashi et al. (2009) except we only require impli-
cation in one direction.
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Thus, pα is the worst option when α = 0 and the best option when α = 1. Now, for any
α ∈ [0, 1], one can interpret ρ (z, pα) as the demand for z relative to pα, where pα is the
outside option. We can thus interpret
z¯ :=
∫ 1
0
ρ (z, pα) dα
as the “average” demand for z. Notice that this formulation of average demand is similar to
the way of measuring consumer surplus by integrating the demand function with respect to
price.49
Average Stationarity says that average demand remains unchanged if all consumptions
are delayed by one period.
Axiom 4 (Average Stationarity). For any z ∈ Zf and c ∈M ,
∫ 1
0
ρ (z, pα) dα =
∫ 1
0
ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,pα)
)
dα.
The axiom can be interpreted as the stationarity on the surplus of menus. To see the
interpretation, recall from McFadden (1978, 1981) that the surplus of a menu z is given by
∫
S
max
p∈z
us (p) dpi. (15)
Following this definition, the surplus of a menu z delayed by one period is given by
∫
S
(∫
S
max
p∈z
us′ (p) dPs
)
dpi. (16)
If the Markov process is stationary (i.e., pi =
∫
S Psdpi), then these two surpluses must be the
same. This is exactly the implication of the axiom. It is straightforward to show that z¯ is
exactly the surplus of the menu and coincides with (15) via standard integration by parts.50
Similarly, it can be shown that the term
∫ 1
0 ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,pα)
)
dα coincides with (16). Thus,
Average Stationarity means that the surplus of the menu does not change by the delay.
While Average Stationarity ensures stationarity of the utility process, it does not guaran-
tee ergodicity of the utility process which is crucial for our representation. This is obtained
by a final axiom called D-continuity (Axiom 5). First, note that by Monotonicity, if z ⊃ y,
49 This is similar to the use of test functions in Lu (2016)
50 To see this, note that z¯ =
∫ 1
0
pi {s : maxp∈z us (p) ≥ α} dα =
∫
S
maxp∈z us (p) dpi. This is similar to the
use of test functions in Lu (2016)
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then clearly ρ (z, y) = 1. By Deterministic Stationarity, this implies that
ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,y)
)
= 1,
which demonstrates classic preference for flexibility. We now require preference for flexibility
to be “robust” in the following sense. For any menu z ∈ Z, let pz¯ := z¯δx¯ + (1− z¯) δx denote
its probability-equivalent where z¯ is its average demand from equation (??). Since average
demand is equivalent to the surplus of the menu, the agent is ex-ante indifferent between the
menu and its probability-equivalent. The last axiom states that preference for flexibility is
robust even if we perturb the menus z and y slightly by mixing them with the probability-
equivalents py¯ and pz¯ respectively.
Axiom 5 (D-continuity). There exists ε > 0 such that for any z, y ∈ Z and c ∈M ,
z ⊃ y =⇒ ρ
(
δ(c,(1−ε)z+εpy¯), δ(c,(1−ε)y+εpz¯)
)
= 1.
D-continuity implies that the utility process satisfies Doeblin’s condition and is thus
ergodic. We are now ready to state our main representation theorem.
Theorem 4. ρ satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if it is ergodic.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
We now provide an outline for the proof of Theorem 4. The first step is the construction of
a random expected utility representation where the probability measure is countably additive
and continuation menus are evaluated according to the additive linear utility function of
Dekel et al. (2001). This exercise faces two technical challenges. First, we need to extend
the random expected utility representation of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) to an infinite-
dimensional space while keeping the countable additivity (Theorem 5 in the Appendix).
Next, we need to extend the representation of Dekel et al. (2001) to countably-additive
probability measures in an infinite-dimensional setting (Theorem 6 in the Appendix). Both
extensions are known challenges in the literature as the set of utilities over an infinite-
dimensional space (without any restrictions) can be no longer compact.51 We employ a
unified methodology that achieves both. The main technical innovation is focusing on the
set of Lipschitz continuous utilities with common bound; this forms a nice compact set
51 For instance, the unit ball is compact in finite-dimensional space but not in infinite-dimensional space.
See the discussion after Theorem 3 in Krishna and Sadowski (2014) for more details.
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according to the Arzela-Ascoli theorem (see Appendix A). This is obtained using the L-
continuity (Axiom 1.6) which is the stochastic version of the Lipschitz continuity axiom
from Dekel et al. (2007). Note that this is not only important for the representation but also
crucial for identification in both settings (Theorem 1). In fact, without such a restriction on
the set of utilities, identification would not be possible.
Once we have a random expected utility representation where continuation menus are
evaluated according to the additive linear functional form, the next step is to show that the
random utilities are derived from the stationary distribution of an ergodic utility process.
This is where the last three axioms come into play. First, by using Deterministic and Aver-
age Stationarity, we show that the random utility is recursive. This allows us to construct a
Markov utility process with a stationary distribution that coincides exactly with the distri-
bution of the random utility from the representation. Next, D-continuity ensures that this
Markov utility process is ergodic. Finally, the representation is obtained by an application
of the Birkhoff ergodic theorem.
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Appendices
A Lipschitz Continuous Utilities
Remember that X = M × Z. Since M and Z are compact metric spaces, X is a compact
metric space. Let C (X) denote the set of continuous functions defined on X, L (X) denote
the set of Lipschitz continuous functions defined on X, and LN (X) the set of Lipschitz
functions defined on X with Lipschitz bound N . We endow C (X) with the topology of
uniform convergence. Fix x, x ∈ X and define
UN : = {u ∈ LN (X) : 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x) = 1 for all x ∈ X} . (17)
For each u ∈ C (X) and p ∈ ∆X, let
u (p) =
∫
X
u dp
denote its expectation. The following result shows that the set of utilities we consider is
compact. It is crucial for both characterization and identification, and highlights the role of
Lipschitz functions.
Lemma 3. UN is compact in C (X).
Proof. We will show this using the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem (Theorem 4.43 of Folland
(2013)). First, we show that LN (X) is equicontinuous. Fix x ∈ X and ε > 0 and con-
sider y ∈ X such that |x− y| < 1
N
ε. Thus, for all u ∈ LN (X)
|u (x)− u (y)| ≤ N |x− y| < ε.
Since this holds for all x ∈ X, UN is equicontinuous. Since 0 ≤ |u| ≤ 1 for all u ∈ UN , UN is
pointwise bounded.
Next, we show that UN is closed. Consider uk ∈ UN such that uk → u. We will show
that u ∈ UN . Since uk is bounded, we have
u (x)− u (y) = lim
k
(uk (x)− uk (y)) ≤ lim
k
N |x− y| = N |x− y|
for all x, y ∈ X. Thus, u ∈ LN (X). Next, note that for all k,
0 = uk (x) ≤ uk (x) ≤ uk (x¯) = 1
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so 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) = 1. This shows u ∈ UN , hence UN is closed. By the
Arzela-Ascoli (Theorem 4.43 of Folland (2013)) , UN is compact in C (X). 
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We first show the following lemma which characterizes distributions on a compact subset of
C (X).
Lemma 4. Let µ, ν ∈ ∆U where U is a compact subset of C (X). If for all r ≥ 0 and
p ∈ ∆X, ∫
U
eru(p)dµ =
∫
U
eru(p)dν
then µ = ν.
Proof. Let Φ denote the set of continuous functions φ defined on U such that
φ (u) =
n∑
i=1
aie
riu(pi)
for some n, ai ∈ R, ri ≥ 0 and pi ∈ ∆X for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, for all φ ∈ Φ,
∫
U
φ (u) dµ =
∫
U
n∑
i=1
aie
riu(pi)dµ =
∫
U
n∑
i=1
aie
riu(pi)dν =
∫
U
φ (u) dν
We will show that Φ is uniformly dense in C (U) by the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem
(Theorem 9.13 of Aliprantis and Border (2006) (henceforth, AB)). First note that Φ is a
vector space that includes constants since e0u(p) = 1 ∈ Φ.
To show that Φ is closed under multiplication. Consider a1e
r1u(p1), a2e
r1u(p2) ∈ Φ. If
r1 + r2 > 0, then
a1e
r1u(p1)a2e
r2u(p2) = a1a2e
(r1+r2)u
(
r1
r1+r2
p1+
(
1−
r1
r1+r2
)
p2
)
∈ Φ
On the other hand, if r1 + r2 = 0, then r1 = r2 = 0 and
a1e
r1u(p1)a2e
r2u(p2) = a1a2 ∈ Φ
This means that Φ is closed under multiplication.
Next, we show that Φ separates points in U . Suppose u, v ∈ U such that u 6= v. Thus,
there is some x ∈ X such that u (x) > v (x) without loss of generality. If we let p = δx, then
u (p) = u (x) > v (x) = v (p) so eu(p) > ev(p). This establishes that Φ separates points in U .
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Since U is compact, Φ is a subalgebra, contains the constant function and separates
points in U , Φ is uniformly dense in C (U) by the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem. This means
that for any φ ∈ C (U), we can find φk ∈ Φ such that φk → φ uniformly. Hence, if we fix
some ε > 0, then there exists some n such that |φk − φ| ≤ ε for all k > n. This implies that
for all u ∈ U ,
φk (u) ≤ |φk (u)− φ (u)|+ |φ (u)| ≤ |φ (u)|+ ε.
Thus, φk are all dominated by a integrable function, so by dominated convergence,∫
U
φ (u) dµ = lim
k
∫
U
φk (u) dµ = lim
k
∫
U
φk (u) dν =
∫
U
φ (u) dν.
By AB Theorem 15.1, µ = ν. 
We now prove Lemma 1. Define the mapping ξ : S → U as in equation (3), or
ξs (c, z) = φs
(
c,
∫
S
sup
p∈z
us˜ (p) dPs
)
.
Consider two states s, s′ ∈ S such that ξs = ξs′. We will show that this means that Ps◦ξ
−1 =
Ps′ ◦ ξ
−1. Let ν = Ps ◦ ξ
−1, ν ′ = Ps′ ◦ ξ
−1 and z =
{
p, αδx¯ + (1− α) δx
}
. Since ξs = ξs′ and
φ· is strictly increasing in the second argument, we have∫
U
max {u (p) , α}dν =
∫
S
sup
p∈z
us˜ (p) dPs =
∫
S
sup
p∈z
us˜ (p) dPs′ =
∫
U
max {u (p) , α} dν ′
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. By Theorem 1.57 of Müller and Stoyan (2002), for any increasing convex
function ϕ, ∫
U
ϕ (u (p)) dν =
∫
U
ϕ (u (p)) dν ′.
Thus by Lemma 4, ν = ν ′ because ν and ν ′ are probability measures on UN , which is compact
by Lemma 3.
We can now define a transition kernel νv on U such that νv := Ps ◦ ξ
−1 where v = us. If
we let µ = pi ◦ ξ−1, then
∫
U
νv (B) dµ =
∫
S
νus (B) dpi =
∫
S
Ps
(
ξ−1 (B)
)
dpi = pi
(
ξ−1 (B)
)
= µ (B) ,
where the first and the last equality hold by the definition of µ, the second equality holds
by definition of νv, and the third equality holds because pi is a stationary distribution of P .
Thus, the utility process is a stationary Markov process. Moreover, for any measurable B,
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we have µ-a.s.
νv (B) = Ps
(
ξ−1 (B)
)
≥ δpi
(
ξ−1 (B)
)
= δµ (B)
so the Markov process satisfies Doeblin’s condition and is thus ergodic.
B Proof of Theorem 1 (Uniqueness)
From Lemma 1, the utility process is ergodic so let µ and µ′ denote the stationary utility
distributions for ρ and ρ′ respectively. For every z = {p, q} ∈ Z∗, we have
ρz (p) = lim
n→∞
1
n
∑
k≥0
1B(p,z) (stk+1) = µ {u ∈ U : u (p) ≥ u (q)}
and likewise for ρ′ and µ′, where the first equality is by the ergodic representation and the
second equality is by the Birkoff ergodic theorem.
Choose any binary menu z = {p, q} ∈ Z. For each t ∈ T , define
pt = pzt,t, q
t = qzt,t.
Then pt → p and qt → q as t→∞. By definition zt = {pt, qt} ∈ Z∗ and zt → z by Lemma
2.
Step 1: If u (p) = u (q) with µ-measure zero, then limt→∞ ρ (p
t, qt) = µ {u (p) ≥ u (q)}.
Proof. First, note that µ-a.s.
lim
t
1u(pt)≥u(qt) = 1u(p)≥u(q)
To see why, first suppose u (p) ≥ u (q), but lim inft 1u(pt)≥u(qt) = 0. Thus, we can find a
subsequence pk, qk such that u
(
pk
)
< u
(
qk
)
so u (p) ≤ u (q) yielding a contradiction as
u (p) 6= u (q) µ-a.s.. On the other hand, if u (p) < u (q), then clearly lim supt 1u(pt)≥u(qt) = 0.
By the dominated convergence theorem, we thus have
lim
t
ρ
(
pt, qt
)
= lim
t
∫
U
1u(pt)≥u(qt)dµ =
∫
U
1u(p)≥u(q)dµ = µ {u (p) ≥ u (q)}
as desired. 
Step 2: If u (p) = u (q) with µ′-a.s., then u (p) = u (q) with µ-a.s.
Proof. Let q = pα := αδx¯ + (1− α) δx and suppose that u (p) = u (q) = α µ
′-a.s. We will
show that this implies u (p) = α µ-a.s. Fix a positive number ε. Consider pα+ε and pα−ε
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and note that u (pα+ε) > u (p) > u (pα−ε) µ
′-a.s. for all ε > 0. By regularity, without loss of
generality, we can choose ε such that u (p) = u (pα+ε) and u (p) = u (pα−ε) with µ-measure
zero. Thus,
µ {u (p) ≥ u (pα−ε)} = lim
t
ρ
(
pt, ptα−ε
)
= lim
t
ρ′
(
pt, ptα−ε
)
= µ′ {u (p) ≥ u (pα−ε)} = 1,
where the first and the third equality hold by Step 1, the second equality holds by the
supposition of Theorem 1 that ρ and ρ′ coincide on binary sets, and the last equality holds
by the supposition that u (p) = α µ′-a.s.. By the symmetric argument for p and pα+ε,
µ {u (pα+ε) ≥ u(p)} = lim
t
ρ
(
ptα+ε, p
t
)
= lim
t
ρ′
(
ptα+ε, p
t
)
= µ′ {u (pα+ε) ≥ u (p)} = 1.
Thus, u (p) ∈ [α− ε, α+ ε] µ-a.s. Since ε is an arbitrary positive number, u (p) = α µ-a.s.
as desired. 
Step 3: For any p ∈ ∆(X), u (p) has the same distribution under µ and under µ′.
Proof. Fix any p ∈ ∆(X) and α ∈ R to show
µ {u (p) ≥ α} = µ′ {u (p) ≥ α} .
By the regularity of µ, it suffices to consider the following two cases.
Case 1: The case when µ{u(p) = α} = 0. Let q = pα := αδx¯ + (1− α) δx. By Step 1
µ{u(p) ≥ α} = lim
t→∞
ρ(ρt, q) = lim
t→∞
ρ′(ρt, q) = µ′{u(p) ≥ α}.
Case 2: The case when µ{u(p) = α} = 1. By Step 2, µ′{u(p) = α} = 1 = µ{u(p) =
α}. 
Now, by Step 3, ∫
U
eru(p)dµ =
∫
U
eru(p)dµ′
for all r ≥ 0 and p ∈ ∆X. Since µ and µ′ are probability measure on UN , which is compact
by Lemma 3. Thus, µ = µ′ by Lemma 4. Since each u ∈ U determines the transition kernel
on U , this means that the Markov utility process induced by µ and µ′ are the same. The
converse is trivial.
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C Extension Theorems
In this section, we employ a unified methodology to extend both Gul and Pesendorfer (2006)
(henceforth GP) and Dekel et al. (2001) (henceforth DLR)52 to countably-additive probabil-
ity measures in infinite-dimensional settings. In both cases, we achieve this by focusing on
the set of Lipschitz continuous utilities with a common bound. Note that this is a compact
set by the same argument as in Lemma 3 which ensures our representations are unique. We
first focus on finite-dimensional settings and then apply Kolmogorov’s extension theorem
followed by Tietze extension theorem (Theorem 4.16 of Folland (2013)). On an abstract
level, this is analogous to the extension to uniformly continuous paths for the construction
of Brownian motion.53
Throughout this section, we will let X be a compact metric space and UN be the set of
Lipschitz continuous utilities with common bound N defined by (17). We will assume that
X contains two elements x¯ and x.
The following preliminary lemma modified from Dekel et al. (2007) characterizes Lipschitz
continuous functions on a dense subset.
Lemma 5. Let X∗ be a dense subset of X and suppose v : X∗ → R is such that v (x¯) = 1
and v (x) = 0. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) There exist N > 0 such that if |x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
for x1, x2 ∈ X
∗ and α ∈ [0, 1], then
αv (x¯) + (1− α) v (x1) ≥ αv (x) + (1− α) v (x2) .
(ii) v is Lipschitz continuous with bound N .
Proof. Suppose (i) is true. Fix some α¯ < 1 and consider x1, x2 ∈ X
∗. First suppose
|x1 − x2|N = α ≤ α¯ < 1. We thus have αv (x) + (1− α) v (x2) ≤ αv (x¯) + (1− α) v (x1).
Hence
v (x2)− v (x1) ≤
α
1− α
=
N
1− α
|x1 − x2| ≤
N
1− α¯
|x1 − x2| .
52 See also Dekel et al. (2007).
53 Other papers that also employ Kolmogorov’s extension in this manner include Lu and Saito (2018), who
do not address the continuity of utilities, and Frick et al. (2018), who obtain a measure with finite support
(ignoring ties).
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Now suppose |x1 − x2|N = α > α¯. Since X is a convex metric space, we can find yi :=(
1− i
n
)
x1 +
i
n
x2 ∈ X for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such that
|yi+1 − yi| =
1
n
|x1 − x2| <
α¯
N
Since X∗ is dense in X and the metric mapping is continuous, we can choose n large enough
such that for each ε > 0, we can find y∗i ∈ X
∗ such that |yi − y
∗
i | ≤ ε and
∣∣∣y∗i+1 − y∗i ∣∣∣ < α¯N
for all i. From the argument above, we have
v
(
y∗i+1
)
− v (y∗i ) ≤
N
1− α¯
∣∣∣y∗i+1 − y∗i ∣∣∣
≤
N
1− α¯
(
|yi+1 − yi|+
∣∣∣y∗i+1 − yi+1∣∣∣+ |y∗i − yi|)
≤
N
1− α¯
(|yi+1 − yi|+ 2ε) =
N
1− α¯
(
1
n
|x1 − x2|+ 2ε
)
Since we can let y∗0 = y0 = x1 and y
∗
n = yn = x2, this implies that
v (x2)− v (x1) ≤
∑
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣v (y∗i )− v (y∗i−1)∣∣∣ ≤ N1− α¯ (|x1 − x2|+ 2nε)
Taking ε→ 0 yields
v (x2)− v (x1) ≤
N
1− α¯
|x1 − x2|
Since N
1−α¯
→ N as α¯→ 0, this means that |v (x2)− v (x1)| ≤ N |x1 − x2| for all x1, x2 ∈ X
∗.
Thus, v is Lipschitz continuous with bound N as desired.
Now, suppose (ii) is satisfied. Note that if α = 1, then the result is trivial so assume
α < 1. Suppose that |x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
and since v ∈ LN (X
∗),
v (x2)− v (x1) ≤ N |x1 − x2| ≤
N
1− α
|x1 − x2| ≤
α
1− α
Rearranging yields
αv (x) + (1− α) v (x2) ≤ αv (x¯) + (1− α) v (x1)
as desired. 
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C.1 Extension of Gul and Pesendorfer (2006)
In this section, we extend the main theorem of GP. Let Z = K (∆X) denote the set of
non-empty compact subsets of ∆X. We consider a stochastic choice function ρ on Zf , the
finite menus in Z. That is for every z ∈ Zf , ρz is a Borel probability measure over z. We
model ties as in Lu (2016) and let Z◦ ⊂ Zf denote the set of finite menus that contain no
ties.
Condition 1.1 (Monotonicity). z ⊂ y implies ρz (p) ≥ ρy (p)
Condition 1.2 (Linearity). ρz (p) = ραz+(1−α)q (αp+ (1− α) q)
Condition 1.3 (Extremeness). ρz (ext (z)) = 1
Condition 1.4 (Continuity). ρ : Z◦ → ∆(∆X) is continuous
Condition 1.5 (Best-Worst). ρ (x, x¯) = 0 and ρ (x¯, x) = ρ (x, x) = 1 for all x ∈ X.
Condition 1.6 (L-continuity). There exists N > 0 such that for α ∈ [0, 1], |x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
implies ρ
(
αδx¯ + (1− α) δx1, αδx + (1− α) δx2
)
= 1.
We will now prove the following extension of GP to an infinite-dimensional setting. We
say a probability measure on UN is regular if u (p) = u (q) occurs with probability zero or
one for all p, q ∈ ∆X
Theorem 5 (GP extension). ρ satisfies C1 if and only if there exists a regular probability
measure µ on UN such that for any z ∈ Z
f ,
ρz (p) = µ {u ∈ UN : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z}
The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. C1.1-C1.3 follow from the same arguments
as in GP while C1.4 follows from the same argument as in Lu (2016). It is easy to see C1.5
from the representation while C1.6 follows from Lemma 5 above.
We now show sufficiency and suppose ρ satisfies C1. Since X is separable, let X∗ ⊂ X
be a countable dense subset of X and without loss of generality, assume x, x¯ ∈ X∗.
Lemma 6. There exists a probability measure µ on the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to
uniform convergence on UN such that for all finite W ⊂ X
∗ and finite z ⊂ ∆W ,
ρz (p) = µ {u ∈ UN : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z} .
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Proof. We prove this in a series of steps.
Step 1: There exists a probability measure pi on the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to point-
wise convergence on RX
∗
such that for all finite W ⊂ X∗ and finite z ⊂ ∆W ,
ρz (p) = pi
{
u ∈ RX
∗
: u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z
}
.
Proof. From Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Lu (2016), C1.1-C1.4 imply that for each
finite W ⊂ X∗ where x, x¯ ∈ W , there exists a probability measure piW on R
W such that for
any finite z ⊂ ∆W ,
ρz (p) = piW
{
u ∈ RW : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z
}
Moreover, C1.5 implies that we can assume µ-a.s. 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) = 1 for
all x ∈ X∗ without loss of generality. By the uniqueness result of GP, all these piW are
consistent.54 Thus, by Kolmogorov’s extension, there exists a measure pi on RX
∗
such that
for all finite W ⊂ X∗ and finite z ⊂ ∆W ,
ρz (p) = pi
{
u ∈ RX
∗
: u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z
}
Moreover, we can assume that pi is a measure on the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to
pointwise convergence on RX
∗
(i.e., the product topology, see exercise I.6.35 of Çınlar (2011)).

Step 2: There exists N > 0 such that pi-a.s. for all α ∈ [0, 1] and x1, x2 ∈ X
∗,
|x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
=⇒ α+ (1− α)u (x1) ≥ (1− α) u (x2) .
Proof. For α ∈ [0, 1] and x1, x2 ∈ X
∗, define
Ux1,x2α :=
{
u ∈ RX
∗
: |x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
=⇒ α + (1− α) u (x1) ≥ (1− α)u (x2)
}
.
By C1.6, there exists N > 0 such that pi (Ux1,x2α ) = 1 for all α ∈ [0, 1] and x1, x2 ∈ X
∗. Let
Uα :=
⋂
x1,x2∈X∗ U
x1,x2
α so by the countable additivity of pi and the fact that X
∗ is a countable
dense subset of X, pi (Uα) = 1 for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Let I
∗ be the rationals in [0, 1] so by the
same argument, pi (
⋂
α∈I∗ Uα) = 1.
We will show that pi
(⋂
α∈[0,1) Uα
)
= 1. It suffices to show that
⋂
α∈I∗ Uα ⊂
⋂
α∈[0,1) Uα.
54 Note that this requires normalized utilities.
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We will show that for any u ∈
⋂
α∈I∗ Uα and α ∈ [0, 1), u ∈ Uα. Choose any x1, x2 ∈ X
∗
such that |x2 − x1| ≤ α/N and consider a sequence αk of I
∗ such that αk → α and αk ≥ α.
Since |x2 − x1| ≤ αk/N and u ∈
⋂
α∈I∗ Uα, we have u (x2)− u (x1) ≤ αk/(1− αk) for each k.
Since αk → α, we have u (x2)− u (x1) ≤ α/(1− α) so u ∈ Uα. Thus, pi
(⋂
α∈[0,1] Uα
)
= 1 as
desired. 
By Step 2, Lemma 5 yields pi (LN (X
∗)) = 1. By the Lipschitz version of the Tietze
extension theorem (see McShane (1934)), we can extend pi on LN (X
∗) to a probability
measure µ on LN (X).
Step 3: µ (UN) = 1.
Proof. For each x ∈ X, define
Ux :=
{
u ∈ LN (X) : 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) = 1
}
.
Then pi (Ux) = 1 for any x ∈ X. By the countable additivity of pi, we have pi (
⋂
x∈X∗ Ux) = 1.
We will show that pi (
⋂
x∈X Ux) = 1. It suffices to prove that ∩x∈X∗Ux ⊂ ∩x∈XUx. Suppose
that u ∈ ∩x∈X∗Ux and consider x ∈ X. If x ∈ X
∗, then the result holds trivially so suppose
x 6∈ X∗. Since X∗ is dense in X, there exists a sequence xk of X
∗ such that xk → x. Since
0 ≤ u (xk) ≤ 1 for each k, we have 0 ≤ u (x) ≤ 1 by the continuity of u. 
Finally, since X is compact, pointwise convergence is equivalent to uniform convergence
on UN . Thus, µ is a measure on the Borel σ-algebra corresponding to uniform convergence.

Define
B (p, z) := {u ∈ UN : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z}
so B (p, z) is µ-measurable. Also define B (p, q) := B (p, {p, q}) to simplify notation.
We will show that ρz (p) = µ (B (p, z)). First, we prove a series of lemmas. The following
is straightforward but will be useful for latter analysis.
Lemma 7. For every p ∈ ∆X, there exists a sequence pn → p such that each pn has a finite
support in X∗.
Proof. Since X∗ is dense and Dirac measures are extreme points in ∆X, the result follows
from the Krein-Milman theorem (AB Theorem 15.10). 
The next two lemmas deals with ties in the stochastic choice.
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Lemma 8. Suppose z ∈ Z◦ and pn → p for every p ∈ z where each pn has finite support in
X∗. If zn := {pn : p ∈ z} ∈ Z
◦, then ρz (p) ≤ µ (B (p, z)).
Proof. First, note that since pn → p for every p ∈ z, zn → z. Since zn, z ∈ Z
◦, Continuity
(C1.4) implies that
ρz (p) = lim
n
ρzn (pn) = limn
µ (B (pn, zn))
where the last equality follows from the representation as each pn has finite support in X
∗.
Note that
lim sup
n
1B(pn,zn) ≤ 1B(p,z)
To see why, note that if lim supn 1B(pn,zn) (u) = 1, then there exists a subsequence {(pk, zk)}
such that u (pk) ≥ u (qk) for all qk ∈ zk so u (p) ≥ u (q). Thus, we have
ρz (p) = lim
n
∫
UN
1B(pn,zn)dµ ≤
∫
UN
lim sup
n
1B(pn,zn)dµ ≤
∫
UN
1B(p,z)dµ = µ (B (p, z)) ,
where the first inequality follows from Fatou’s Lemma. 
Lemma 9. The following statements hold:
(i) If p and q are tied, then u (p) = u (q) a.s.
(ii) If p and q are not tied, then u (p) 6= u (q) a.s.
Proof. First, we show that if p is not tied with x, then ρ (x, p) = 0. By Lemma 7, there
exists pn → p where pn has finite support in X
∗. Let p˜n :=
(
1− 1
n
)
pn +
1
n
δx¯ and note that
p˜n cannot be tied with x since a.s.
u (p˜n) =
(
1−
1
n
)
u (pn) +
1
n
> 0
Note that p˜n → p and each p˜n also has finite support in X
∗. Since {x, p˜n} ∈ Z
◦ and
{x, p˜n} → {x, p} ∈ Z
◦, Continuity (C1.4) yields
ρ (x, p) = lim
n
ρ (x, p˜n) = lim
n
µ {0 ≥ u (p˜n)} = 0
as desired. We now prove the lemma via two steps.
Step 1: If p and q are tied, then u (p) = u (q) a.s.
Proof. First, suppose p is not tied with x so ρ (x, p) = 0 from above. Let pε := (1− ε) p+εδx
so ρ (pε, p) = 0 by Linearity (C1.2). Since p and q are tied, ρ (pε, q) = 0 by Lemma A.2 of
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Lu (2016). Consider zεn = {p
ε
n, qn} where p
ε
n → p
ε, qn → q and p
ε
n and qn both have finite
support in X∗ as from Lemma 7. If pεn is tied with qn, let
p˜εn :=
(
1−
1
n
)
pεn +
1
n
δx
q˜n :=
(
1−
1
n
)
qn +
1
n
δx¯
so {p˜εn, q˜n} ∈ Z
◦. Since {p˜εn, q˜n} → {p
ε, q} ∈ Z◦, by Lemma 8,
1 = ρ (q, pε) ≤ µ (B (q, pε)) = µ {u (q) ≥ (1− ε)u (p)}
Thus, a.s.
u (p)− u (q) ≥ −εu (p) ≥ −ε
for all ε > 0 so u (q) ≥ u (p) a.s. By the symmetric reasoning, we have u (p) ≥ u (q) a.s.
Hence u (p) = u (q) a.s.
Finally, note that if p is tied with δx, then
1
2
p+ 1
2
δx¯ is tied with
1
2
δx+
1
2
δx¯ where the latter
is not tied with δx. Applying the above argument yields
1
2
u (p) + 1
2
= 1
2
a.s. or u (p) = 0 a.s.
as desired. 
Step 2: If p and q are not tied, then u (p) 6= u (q) a.s.
Proof. Let p and q be not tied. Consider pε := (1− ε) p+ εδx and q
ε := (1− ε) q + εδx for
ε > 0. Note that if pε and qε are tied, then from (i), we have a.s.
u (p) = u (q) +
ε
1− ε
Thus, we can choose ε → 0 such that pε and qε are not tied. Consider zεn = {p
ε
n, q
ε
n} where
pεn → p
ε, qεn → q
ε and pεn and qn both have finite support in X
∗ as above. Again, let
p˜εn :=
(
1−
1
n
)
pεn +
1
n
δx
q˜εn :=
(
1−
1
n
)
qεn +
1
n
δx¯
so {p˜εn, q˜
ε
n} ∈ Z
◦. Since {p˜εn, q˜
ε
n} → {p
ε, qε} ∈ Z◦, by Lemma 8,
ρ (pε, qε) ≤ µ (B (pε, qε)) = µ
{
u (p)− u (q) ≥
ε
1− ε
}
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As εց 0, {pε, qε} → {p, q} ∈ Z◦ so by Continuity (C1.4),
ρ (p, q) = lim
εց0
ρ (pε, qε) ≤ lim
εց0
µ
{
u (p)− u (q) ≥
ε
1− ε
}
= µ {u (p) > u (q)}
By symmetric reasoning, we have ρ (q, p) ≤ µ {u (p) > u (q)} so
1 = ρ (p, q) + ρ (q, p) ≤ µ {u (p) > u (q)}+ µ {u (p) > u (q)}
Thus, u (p) = u (q) has µ-measure zero. 

We now complete the proof of Theorem 5. Let z ∈ Z◦ and pn → p for every p ∈ z where
each pn has finite support in X
∗. Note that zn := {pn : p ∈ z} → z. Suppose there exists
an infinite subsequence such that zn 6∈ Z
◦. Thus, there must be a subsequence pn, qn ∈ zn
that are tied for each n. By Lemma 9, u (qn) = u (pn) a.s. so u (q) = u (p) a.s. By Lemma 9
again, this means p and q are tied, contradicting z ∈ Z◦. Thus, we can assume that zn ∈ Z
◦
so by Lemma 8, we have ρz (p) ≤ µ (B (p, z)).
Finally, let z0 ⊂ z be such that z0 ∈ Z
◦ so ρz0 (p) ≤ µ (B (p, z0)). Suppose ρz0 (p) <
µ (B (p, z0)) for some p ∈ z0. Thus,
1 =
∑
p∈z0
ρz0 (p) <
∑
p∈z0
µ (B (p, z0)) ≤ 1
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 9 and the fact that z0 has no ties. Since this
yields a contradiction, it must be that ρz0 (p) = µ (B (p, z0)) for all p ∈ z0. Now, for any
p ∈ z, we can find some p0 ∈ z0 tied with p. By Lemma A.2 from Lu (2016), we have
ρz (p) = ρz0 (p0) = µ (B (p0, z)) = µ (B (p, z))
as desired.
C.2 Extension of Dekel et al. (2001)
In this section, we extend the main theorem of DLR. We consider a binary relation  on
Z = K (∆X).55 The methodology by which we extend DLR parallels the way in which we
extended GP. The one technical difference is that there is no need to deal with ties, which
55 While DLR formally considers all non-empty subsets of ∆X , it is without loss to focus on those that
are compact.
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simplifies the DLR extension.
Condition 2.1.  is a preference relation
Condition 2.2 (Flexibility). z ⊂ y implies z  y
Condition 2.3 (Independence). z  y implies αz + (1− α)w  αy + (1− α)w
Condition 2.4 (Continuity).  is continuous
Condition 2.5 (Best-Worst). x¯  {x, x¯} and x  {x, x} for all x ∈ X
Condition 2.6 (L-continuity). There exists N > 0 such that for α ∈ [0, 1], |x1 − x2| ≤
α
N
implies
(1− α) δx1 + αδx¯ 
{
(1− α) δx1 + αδx¯, (1− α) δx2 + αδx
}
We will now prove the following extension of DLR to an infinite-dimensional setting.
Theorem 6 (DLR extension).  satisfies C2 if and only if there exists a probability measure
ν on UN such that  is represented by the function v : Z → R where
v (z) =
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dν
The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. C2.1-C2.4 follow from the same arguments
as in DLR. It is easy to see C2.5 from the representation while C2.6 follows from Lemma 5
above.
We now show sufficiency and suppose  satisfies C2. Since X is separable, let X∗ ⊂ X
be a countable dense subset of X and without loss of generality, assume x, x¯ ∈ X∗.
Lemma 10. There exists a probability measure ν on UN such that for all finite W ⊂ X
∗,
the function v : Z → R where
v (z) =
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dν
represents  on K (∆W ).
Proof. From DLR, C2.1-C2.4 imply that for each finite W ⊂ X∗ where x, x¯ ∈ W , there
exists a probability measure µW on R
W such that
∫
RW
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµW
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represents  on K (∆W ). By C2.5, we have u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) µW -a.s. for all x ∈ X.
Thus, we can assume that u (x¯) = 1 and u (x) = 0 without loss of generality. With this
normalization of utilities, the DLR representation is unique so all these µW are consistent.
By Kolmogorov’s extension, there exists a measure µ on RX
∗
such that
∫
RX
∗
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ
represents  on K (∆W ) for all finite W ⊂ X∗.
By C2.6, there exists N > 0 such that for all α ∈ [0, 1] and x1, x2 ∈ X
∗, µ-a.s. |x1 − x2| ≤
α/N implies α + (1− α)u (x1) ≥ (1− α)u (x2). Since X
∗ is countable dense subset of X,
[0, 1] is separable, and µ is countably-additive, by the same argument as in Step 2 of Lemma
6, there exists N > 0 such that µ-a.s. for all α ∈ [0, 1] and x1, x2 ∈ X
∗, |x1 − x2| ≤ α/N
implies α + (1− α)u (x1) ≥ (1− α)u (x2). Applying Lemma 5 yields µ-a.s. u is Lipschitz
continuous with bound N .
By the Lipschitz version of the Tietze extension theorem, we can extend µ on RX
∗
on
to a probability measure ν on LN (X). Moreover, 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) = 1 ν-a.s. for
all x ∈ X∗. Since X∗ is countable dense in X and µ is countably additive, by the same
argument as in Step 3 of Lemma 6, this means that ν-a.s. 0 = u (x) ≤ u (x) ≤ u (x¯) = 1 for
all x ∈ X so ν (UN) = 1. Thus,
v (z) :=
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dν
represents  on K (∆W ) for all finite W ⊂ X∗. 
We now complete the proof of Theorem 6. First we show that v is continuous. Note
that zn → z implies supp∈zn u (p)→ supp∈z u (p) for all u ∈ UN . By dominated convergence,
v (zn)→ v (z) so v is continuous.
Now, consider a generic z ∈ Z. Notice that z ∼ αδx¯ + (1− α) δx where α = v (z). For
any p ∈ ∆X, by Lemma 7, we can find pn with finite support in X
∗ such that pn → p.
Let zn := {pn : p ∈ z} so zn → z and zn ∈ K (∆Wn) for some finite Wn ⊂ X
∗. Define
αn := v (zn) ∈ [0, 1] and without loss of generality, assume αn → α
∗. Since v is continuous,
α = v (z) = α∗. Note that by C2.4, x  zn  x¯ for all zn implies x  z  x¯. Now, suppose
z ≻ αδx¯ + (1− α) δx so we can find some β > α such that z ≻ βδx¯ + (1− β) δx. Since
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αn → α < β, this means that for large enough n,
βδx¯ + (1− β) δx ≻ αnδx¯ + (1− αn) δx ∼ zn
where the indifference follows from the representation. By C2.4, we have βδx¯+(1− β) δx  z
yielding a contradiction. The case z ≺ αδx¯+(1− α) δx is symmetric so z ∼ αδx¯+(1− α) δx.
Finally, to complete the proof, note that z  y if and only if
v (z) δx¯ + (1− v (z)) δx  v (y) δx¯ + (1− v (y)) δx
if and only if v (z) ≥ v (y). Thus, v represents  on Z.
Notice that the arguments in Lemma 10 corresponds exactly to those of Lemma 6 in the
previous section. The remaining arguments are significantly simpler than those in Lemma
7–9 as there is no need deal with ties. Other than this technical difference, the methodology
for extending DLR is identical to that for extending GP.
D Proof of Theorem 4 (Representation)
D.1 Sufficiency of Axioms
We first prove the sufficiency of the axioms. Note that Axiom 1 corresponds exactly to C1
so by Theorem 5, there exists a regular probability measure µ on UN such that for any finite
z ∈ Z,
ρz (p) = µ {u ∈ UN : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z}
Choose any z1, z2 ∈ Z. Let z = {p1, p2} and y = {q1, q2} where pi = δ(c,zi) and qi =
1
2
pi ⊕
1
2
δ(d,w) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Applying Axiom 2 for α =
1
2
, we have
µ {u (p1) ≥ u (p2)} = ρz (p1) = ρ 1
2
z+ 1
2
y
(
1
2
p1 +
1
2
q1
)
= µ {u (p1) ≥ u (p2) and u (q1) ≥ u (q2)}
Applying Axiom 2 for α = 0 and α = 1
2
, we have
µ {u (q1) ≥ u (q2)} = ρy (q1) = ρ 1
2
z+ 1
2
y
(
1
2
p1 +
1
2
q1
)
= µ {u (p1) ≥ u (p2) and u (q1) ≥ u (q2)} .
Thus, we have
0 = µ {u (p1) ≥ u (p2) and u (q1) < u (q2)} = µ {u (p1) < u (p2) and u (q1) ≥ u (q2)}
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so u (p1) ≥ u (p2) if and only if u (q1) ≥ u (q2) µ-a.s.
For all c, d ∈M , z1, z2, w ∈ Z, and λ ∈ [0, 1], we thus have µ-a.s.
u (c, z1) ≥ u (c, z2)
⇔ u (λc+ (1− λ) d, λz1 + (1− λ)w) ≥ u (λc+ (1− λ) d, λz2 + (1− λ)w) (18)
Since Z,M and [0, 1] are all separable and any u ∈ Un is continuous, by the countable
additivity of µ, we have that the above holds µ-a.s. for all c, d ∈ M and z1, z2, w ∈ Z and
λ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, this holds for the special case when d = c. Moreover, we also have
that µ-a.s. that for all c, c′ ∈M and z1, z2, w ∈ Z,
u (c, z1) ≥ u (c, z2)
⇔ u
(
1
2
c+
1
2
c′,
1
2
z1 +
1
2
w
)
≥ u
(
1
2
c+
1
2
c′,
1
2
z2 +
1
2
w
)
⇔ u (c′, z1) ≥ u (c
′, z2) (19)
We can now define a preference relation u on Z for each u ∈ UN such that z u y if and
only if u (c, z) ≥ u (c, y). Note that this is well-defined as it does not depend on c ∈ M by
(19) above.
We now show that u satisfies C2 µ-a.s. Note that C2.1 is trivial and C2.3 follows from
(18) above. To see C2.2, note that from Axiom 3, for any z, y, if z ⊃ y, then
1 = ρ (z, y) = ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,y)
)
= µ {u (c, z) ≥ u (c, y)} .
Since µ is countably additive, u ∈ UN is continuous and Z is separable, C2.2 follows. Note
that C2.4 follows from the continuity of u ∈ UN . Finally, by applying Axiom 3 to Axioms
1.5 and 1.6, we obtain C2.5 and C2.6 respectively by the same argument as before.
Applying Theorem 6, this means that u is represented by
vu (z) :=
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p) dνu
where νu is a probability measure on UN . Since for every c ∈ M , u (c, ·) and vu represent
the same preference, we can write
u (c, z) = φu (c, vu (z))
where φu :M × [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is strictly increasing in the second argument. Note that this is
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well-defined as it does not depend on c ∈ M by (19).
The following result shows that µ is the invariant measure of the transition kernel νu.
Lemma 11. For any measurable set B ⊂ UN ,
µ (B) =
∫
UN
νu (B) dµ
Proof. Define the measure µ∗ on UN such that for every measurable B ⊂ UN , µ
∗ (B) =∫
UN
νu (B) dµ. We will show that µ
∗ = µ. Consider finite z ∈ Z and note that ρ (z, pα) =
µ
{
supp∈z u (p) ≥ α
}
. Thus,
∫
[0,1]
ρ (z, pα) dα =
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ (20)
On the other hand, ρ ((c, z) , (c, pα)) = µ {φu (c, vu (z)) ≥ φu (c, vu (pα))} = µ {vu (z) ≥ α},
so
∫
[0,1]
ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,pα)
)
dα =
∫
UN
vu (z) dµ. (21)
Applying Axiom 4 to the left-hand sides of (20) and (21), we thus have
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ =
∫
UN
vu (z) dµ =
∫
UN
(∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p) dνu
)
dµ =
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ∗.
Letting z = {p, pα}, we have
∫
UN
max {u (p) , α} dµ =
∫
UN
max {u (p) , α} dµ∗. By Theorem
1.57 of Müller and Stoyan (2002), for any increasing convex function φ,
∫
UN
φ (u (p)) dµ =
∫
UN
φ (u (p)) dµ∗.
Since UN is compact by Lemma 3, µ = µ
∗ by Lemma 4. 
Let U1 be the set of u ∈ UN such that there exists φu and νu where
u (c, z) = φu
(
c,
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p) dνu
)
so µ (U1) = 1. Recursively define Un+1 := {u ∈ Un : νu (U
n) = 1} and let U∗ :=
⋂∞
n=1 U
n.
We show that µ (U∗) = 1. First, we show that µ (Un) = 1 for all n by induction. Suppose
µ (Un) = 1 so by Lemma 11,
1 = µ (Un) =
∫
UN
νu (U
n) dµ.
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Thus, νu (U
n) = 1 µ-a.s. so µ (Un+1) = 1. Since µ (U1) = 1, this means that µ (Un) = 1 for
all n. Since Un+1 ⊂ Un, by Proposition 3.6 of Çınlar (2011), µ (U∗) = limn µ (U
n) = 1.
By Lemma 11 again, we have
1 = µ (U∗) =
∫
UN
νu (U
∗) dµ
so νu (U
∗) = 1 µ-a.s. This means that µ-a.s. that
u (c, z) = φu
(
c,
∫
U∗
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p) dνu
)
and ρz (p) = µ (B (p, z)) for any finite z ∈ Z where B (p, z) := {u ∈ U
∗ : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z}.
We can now define a Markov process [P ] on S := U∗ with invariant distribution µ and tran-
sition kernel Ps := νu for all s = u ∈ U
∗.
We now prove that the Markov process [P ] satisfies Doeblin continuity (i.e., there exists
some δ > 0 such that µ-a.s. νu (A) ≥ δµ (A) for all measurable A). For this purpose,
we will show a lemma on the density of the set of support functions For any z ∈ Z,
define the support function σz : UN → R by σz (u) := supp∈z u (p). Define the sets
Σ := {r (σz − σy) : r > 0 and z, y ∈ Z} and Σ
f :=
{
r (σz − σy) : r > 0 and z, y ∈ Z
f
}
,
where σz is the support function of z ∈ Z.
Lemma 12. Σf is dense in C (UN).
Proof. Note that for any z ∈ Z, we can find zk ∈ Zf such that zk → z (see Lemma 0 of
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)). Thus, σzk → σz by Theorem 7.52 of AB. So Σ
f is dense in Σ.
To show the lemma, therefore, it suffices to show that Σ is dense in C (UN).
First, we show that Σ is a linear subspace of C (UN). Consider the singleton menu
z = δx and note that by definition, σz (u) = u (x) = 0 for all u ∈ UN . Thus, 0 ∈ Σ. Next,
note that if r (σz − σy) ∈ Σ, then clearly λr (σz − σy) ∈ Σ for all λ ∈ R. Finally, suppose
r1 (σz1 − σy1) , r2 (σz2 − σy2) ∈ Σ. Since r1, r2 > 0, define λ :=
r1
r1+r2
so we have
r1 (σz1 − σy1) + r2 (σz2 − σy2) = (r1 + r2) [(λσz1 + (1− λ) σz2)− (λσy1 + (1− λ)σy2)]
Since λσz1 +(1− λ) σz2 = σλz1+(1−λ)z2 ∈ Σ (see Lemma 7.54 of AB), we have r1 (σz1 − σy1)+
r2 (σz2 − σy2) ∈ Σ. This shows that Σ is a linear subspace of C (UN ).
We now prove that Σ is dense in C (UN) using the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem. Note
that for z = δx, σz (u) = u (x) = 1 for all u ∈ UN so Σ includes constants. That Σ is a vector
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lattice follows from the same arguments as in Lemma 11 of DLR. Finally, we show that Σ
separates C (UN). Choose any u, v ∈ UN such that u 6= v. Thus, there exists x ∈ X such
that u (x) 6= v (x). If we let z = δx, then
σz (u) = u (x) 6= v (x) = σz (v)
Thus, Σ separates C (UN). Since UN is compact by Lemma 3, the Stone-Weierstrass Theorem
(AB Theorem 9.12) shows that Σ is dense in C (UN ). 
Consider any h ∈ C (UN ) such that h ≥ 0. By Lemma 12, we can find hk ∈ Zf such
that hk → h. Define gk = max {hk, 0} and note that gk → h as h ≥ 0. Moreover, for
hk = r (σz − σy) where z, y ∈ Z
f , we have
gk = rmax {σz − σy, 0} = r (σz∪y − σy) ∈ Σ
f
By Axiom 5, there exists some ε > 0 such that µ-a.s.
∫
U∗
σ(1−ε)(z∪y)+εpεy¯dνu ≥
∫
U∗
σ(1−ε)y+εp
ε(z∪y)
dνu
⇔ (1− ε)
∫
U∗
σz∪ydνu + εy¯ ≥ (1− ε)
∫
U∗
σydνu + ε(z ∪ y)
⇔
∫
U∗
(σz∪y − σy) dνu ≥
ε
1− ε
(
(z ∪ y)− y¯
)
= δ
∫
U∗
(σz∪y − σy) dµ,
where δ := ε
1−ε
. Thus, µ-a.s.
∫
U∗ gkdνu ≥ δ
∫
U∗ gkdµ. Since gk → h, this implies that µ-a.s.∫
U∗ hdνu ≥ δ
∫
U∗ hdµ by the dominated convergence theorem.
Since UN is compact, C (UN) is separable by Lemma 3.99 of AB. Thus, by the countably
additivity of µ, µ-a.s. ∫
U∗
hdνu ≥ δ
∫
U∗
hdµ (22)
for all nonnegative h ∈ C (UN). Now, by the regularity of νu and Urysohn’s lemma (Theorem
4.15 of Folland (2013)), for any measurable A ⊂ U∗, there are nonnegative hk ∈ C (UN ) such
that hk → 1A νu-a.s. Thus, by the dominated convergence theorem, µ-.a.s.
Ps (A) = νu (A) =
∫
U∗
lim
k
hkdνu = lim
k
∫
U∗
hkdνu ≥ lim
k
δ
∫
U∗
hkdµ = δ
∫
U∗
lim
k
hkdµ = δµ (A) ,
where the inequality is by (22).
Since this implies Doeblin’s condition, the Markov process [P ] is uniformly ergodic (see
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Theorem 16.2.3 of Meyn and Tweedie (2012)). By the ergodic theorem, µ-a.s.
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k≥0
1B(p,z) (sk) = µ (B (p, z)) = ρ (p, z)
for all z ∈ Zf as desired. This concludes the sufficiency proof.
D.2 Necessity of Axioms
We now show necessity of the axioms. Note that by Lemma 1, we can consider the ergodic
utility process ut = ust with stationary distribution µ. For any z ∈ Z
f , define
B (p, z) := {u ∈ UN : u (p) ≥ u (q) for all q ∈ z}
By the ergodic theorem, we have for every z ∈ Zf ,
ρ (p, z) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k≥0
1B(p,z) (uk) = µ (B (p, z)) .
Axiom 1 then follows immediately from Theorem 5.
For Axiom 2, let p ∈ z ∈ Zfc , y = λz⊕(1− λ) δ(c′,z′) and q = λp⊕(1− λ) δ(c′,z′) ∈ y where
c, c′ ∈ M , z′ ∈ Z and λ > 0. Note that for p = δ(c,w) , u (p) ≥ u (p
′) for all p′ = δ(c,w′) ∈ z if
and only if vu (w) ≥ vu (w
′) for all w′ where
vu (w) :=
∫
UN
sup
p∈w
u˜ (p) dνu
and νu is the transition kernel corresponding to the ergodic utility process. On the other
hand, for all p′ ∈ z and all q′ = λp′ ⊕ (1− λ) δ(c′,z′) ∈ y,
u (q) ≥ u (q′)⇔ u (λc+ (1− λ) c′, λw + (1− λ) z′) ≥ u (λc+ (1− λ) c′, λw′ + (1− λ) z′)
⇔ vu (λw + (1− λ) z
′) ≥ vu (λw
′ + (1− λ) z′)
⇔ vu (w) ≥ vu (w
′)
for all w′ as λ > 0. Thus, u (p) ≥ u (p′) for all p′ ∈ z iff u (q) ≥ u (q′) for all q′ ∈ y. This
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means that
ρz (p) = µ {u (p) ≥ u (p
′) for all p′ ∈ z}
= µ {αu (p) + (1− α)u (q) ≥ αu (p′) + (1− α)u (q′) for all p′ ∈ z, q′ ∈ y}
= µ {u (αp+ (1− α) q) ≥ u (αp′ + (1− α) q′) for all p′ ∈ z, q′ ∈ y}
= ραz+(1−α)y (αp+ (1− α) q)
as desired.
For Axiom 3, suppose ρ (z, y) = 1. Let
B :=
{
u ∈ UN : max
p∈z
u (p) ≥ max
q∈y
u (q)
}
so µ (B) = 1. Since µ is the stationary distribution, 1 =
∫
UN
νu (B) dµ so νu (B) = 1 µ-a.s.
This implies that vu (z) ≥ vu (y) µ-a.s. so ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,y)
)
= 1 as desired.
For Axiom 4, note that by the same arguments as in Lemma 11,
∫
[0,1]
ρ (z, pα) dα =
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ,
∫
[0,1]
ρ
(
δ(c,z), δ(c,pα)
)
dα =
∫
UN
vu (z) dµ =
∫
UN
(∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p) dνu
)
dµ.
The result follows from the fact that µ is the stationary distribution.
Finally, for Axiom 5, suppose y ⊂ z so
y¯ =
∫
UN
sup
p∈y
u (p) dµ ≤
∫
UN
sup
p∈z
u (p) dµ = z¯
From Lemma 1, we know there exists some δ such that νu (B) ≥ δµ (B) for all measurable
B so
∫
UN
ϕdνu ≥
∫
UN
ϕdµ for all positive measurable functions ϕ. Let ε := δ
1+δ
so δ = ε
1−ε
.
We thus have
vu ((1− ε) z + εpy¯)− vu ((1− ε) y + εpz¯) = (1− ε) (vu (z)− vu (y)) + ε (vu (py¯)− vu (pz¯))
= (1− ε)
∫
UN
(
sup
p∈z
u˜ (p)− sup
p∈y
u˜ (p)
)
dνu + ε (y¯ − z¯)
≥ (1− ε)
ε
1− ε
(z¯ − y¯)− ε (z¯ − y¯) = 0
Thus, ρ
(
δ(c,(1−ε)z+εpy¯), δ(c,(1−ε)y+εpz¯)
)
= 1 as desired. This concludes the proof.
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E Proofs for Section 4
E.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Let µ denote the stationarity distribution for the utility process so by the ergodic theorem,
we have ρ (p, q) = µ {u ∈ U : u (p) ≥ u (q)} for all {p, r} ∈ Z∗. That additive separability
implies 1-ICM and the standard utility implies both 1-ICM and 2-ICM are straightforward.
We now show that 1-ICM implies the utility process is additively separable. Fix z, y ∈ Z.
Consider {p, r} ∈ Z∗ such that
p =
1
4
δ(0,z) +
1
4
δ(0,y) +
1
4
δ(c,z) +
1
4
δ(c,y), r =
1
2
δ(0,z) +
1
2
δ(c,y)
Note that pM = rM =
1
2
δ0+
1
2
δc and pZ = rZ =
1
2
δz+
1
2
δy. Let {q} ∈ Z
∗ denote the singleton
1-period menu such that qM =
1
2
δ0 +
1
2
δc = pM and qZ =
1
2
δz +
1
2
δy. By 1-ICM, we thus
have 1 = ρ{q} (q) = ρ (p, r) = ρ (r, p). Thus a.s.
1
4
u (0, z) + 1
4
u (0, y) + 1
4
u (c, z) + 1
4
u (c, y) =
1
2
u (0, z) + 1
2
u (c, y). That is, u (0, y) + u (c, z) = u (0, z) + u (c, y).
Let y = xt → x so u (0, xt)→ u (x) = 0. If we let
vs (z) := Es
[
sup
p∈z
us′ (p)
]
then vs (x
t)→ 0. Thus, we have a.s. φs (c, vs (z)) = φs (0, vs (z))+φs (c, 0). Letting ws (c) :=
φs (c, 0) and βs (v) = φs (0, v), we have a.s. φs (c, v) = ws (c) + βs (v) as desired.
We now show that imposing 2-ICM in addition to 1-ICM implies the utility process must
be standard. By 1-ICM, we have a.s. φs (c, v) = ws (c) + βs (v) from above. Consider
{p, r} ∈ Z∗ such that
p =
1
4
δ(0,p0) +
1
4
δ(0,δ(0,y)) +
1
4
δ(0,q0) +
1
4
δ(0,r0), r =
1
2
δ(0,p0) +
1
2
δ(0,r0)
where p0 = bδ(0,z)+(1− b) δ(0,y), q0 = abδ(m,z)+a (1− b) δ(m,y)+(1− a) bδ(0,z)+(1− a) (1− b) δ(0,y),
and r0 = aδ(m,y) + (1− a) δ(0,y) for a, b ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the distribution of 2-period
consumptions of p and r are 1
2
δ(0,δ0) +
1
2
δ(0,aδm+(1−a)δ0) while their menu distributions are
1
2
δ(bδz+(1−b)δy) +
1
2
δδy . Thus, by 2-ICM, 1 = ρ(p, r) = ρ(r, p). Hence, we have a.s.
1
4
u (0, p0) +
1
4
u
(
0, δ(0,y)
)
+ 1
4
u (0, q0)+
1
4
u (0, r0) =
1
2
u (0, p0)+
1
2
u (0, r0). That is, u
(
0, δ(0,y)
)
+u (0, q0) =
u (0, p0) + u (0, r0). Thus, we have a.s.
βs (Es [us′ (0, y)]) + βs (Es [us′ (q0)]) = βs (Es [us′ (p0)]) + βs (Es [us′ (r0)])
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Let y = {xt} → {x} and z = x¯t → x¯ so us (0, x
t) → us (x) = 0 and vs (x¯
t) → 1.
By definition, βs (0) = φs (0, 0) = 0 and ws (0) = φs (0, 0) = 0. Thus we have a.s.
βs (Es [aws′ (m) + bβs′ (1)]) = βs (Es [aws′ (m)]) + βs (Es [bβs′ (1)]), or
βs (aEs [ws′ (m)] + bEs [βs′ (1)]) = βs (aEs [ws′ (m)]) + βs (bEs [βs′ (1)]) (23)
for all a, b ∈ [0, 1].
Let ξs := min {Es [ws′ (m)] ,Es [βs′ (1)]}. Since
Es [ws′ (m)] + Es [βs′ (1)] = Es [ws′ (m) + βs′ (1)] = Es [φs (m, 1)] = 1,
ξs > 0. From equation (23), we have βs (x+ y) = βs (x) + βs (y) for all x, y ∈ [0, ξs]. This
is a Cauchy functional equation with bounded domain, and since βs is continuous, we have
a.s. βs (x) = βsx for all x ∈ [0, ξs] where βs is a constant (see pg. 45 of Aczel (1966)). Now,
for v ∈ [0, 2ξs],
βs (v) = βs
(
v
2
+
v
2
)
= 2βs
(
v
2
)
= βsv.
By iteration, we have βs (v) = βsv for all v ∈ [0, 1] as desired.
E.2 Definition of Repeated Independence (RI)
In the main part of the paper, we explained how to mix 1-period menus with a lottery
r ∈ ∆M . In this subsection, we formally define how to mix simple t-period menus. Fix
some t-period menu z ∈ Z∗ that is also t-simple. For any lottery p that yields z in t′ ≤ t
periods, we will define rt′ (p) as the t
′-times repeated mixture between p and r ∈ ∆M . This
is constructed as follows. First, define r1 (·) exactly as in the 1-period case where for every
p,
r1 (p) = (αpM + (1− α) r ; αz  (1− α) r) ,
where pM is the marginal distribution of p on M . Now for 1 < t
′ ≤ t, we will recursively
define rt′ (·). First, given rt′−1 (·) and some p, define two lotteries pˆ and rˆ such that
pˆ (A× B) : = p
(
A× r−1t′−1 (B)
)
rˆ (A× B) : = r (A) p
(
∆M × r−1t′−1 (B)
)
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for all measurable A and B. Note that pˆ and rˆ are the continuation lotteries where all future
lotteries are also mixed with r. Next, define
rt′ (p) = αpˆ+ (1− α) rˆ
Finally, set αp (1− α) r = rt (p) and
αz  (1− α) r := {αp (1− α) r : p ∈ z}
E.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Note that by Theorem 2, all we need to show is that the utility process is standard if and
only if ρ satisfies IRU and RI. Since the standard utility process trivially satisfies IRU and
RI, we will show the converse. By IRU, we have
φs (c, v) = ws (c) + βs (c) v
Note that 0 = φs (0, 0) = ws (0) and 1 = φs (m, 1) = ws (m) + βs (m). Consider a 2-
period z = {p0, q0} ∈ Z
∗ where p0 =
1
2
δ(c1,p) +
1
2
δ(c2,δ(c2,z))
,q0 =
1
2
δ(c1,q) +
1
2
δ(c2,q), p =
λ1δ(m,z) + (1− λ1) δ(c2,z) and q = λ2δ(m,z) + (1− λ2) δ(c2,z) for c1, c2 ∈ (0, m). Note that
us (p0) = ws
(
1
2
δc1 +
1
2
δc2
)
+
1
2
βs (c1)Es [us′ (p)] +
1
2
βs (c2)Es [us′ (c2, z)]
us (q0) = ws
(
1
2
δc1 +
1
2
δc2
)
+
(
1
2
βs (c1) +
1
2
βs (c2)
)
Es [us′ (q)]
To simplify notation, let βi := βs (ci) and u˜s := Es [us′]. Now, us (p0) ≥ us (q0) if and only if
us (p0) ≥ us (q0)⇔ β1u˜s (p) + β2u˜s (c2, z) ≥ (β1 + β2) u˜s (q)
⇔ β1 (u˜s (p)− u˜s (q)) ≥ β2 (u˜s (q)− u˜s (c2, z))
⇔ β1 (λ1 − λ2) (u˜s (m, z)− u˜s (c2, z)) ≥ β2λ2 (u˜s (m, z)− u˜s (c2, z))
⇔ β1λ1 ≥ (β1 + β2)λ2,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that u˜s (m, z) ≥ u˜s (c2, z) a.s. as m ≥ c2.
Let r = δc2 and consider the 2-period z
′ = az  (1− a) r ∈ Z∗. Note that z′ =
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{ap0  (1− a) r, aq0  (1− a) r} where
ap0  (1− a) r =
1
2
(
aδ(c1,p′) + (1− a) δ(c2,p′)
)
+
1
2
δ(
c2,δ(c2,z′)
),
aq0  (1− a) r =
1
2
(
aδ(c1,q′) + (1− a) δ(c2,q′)
)
+
1
2
δ(c2,q′)
and p′ = aλ1δ(m,z′) + (1− aλ1) δ(c2,z′) and q
′ = aλ2δ(m,z′) + (1− aλ2) δ(c2,z′). Note that
us (ap0  (1− a) r) = ws
(
a
2
δc1 +
(
1−
a
2
)
δc2
)
+
1
2
(aβ1 + (1− a) β2) u˜s (p
′) +
1
2
β2u˜s (c2, z
′)
us (aq0  (1− a) r) = ws
(
a
2
δc1 +
(
1−
a
2
)
δc2
)
+
(
a
2
β1 +
(
1−
a
2
)
β2
)
u˜s (q
′)
To simplify notation, let βa := aβ1 + (1− a) β2 and recall u˜s = Es [us′]. Now we have
us (ap0  (1− a) r) ≥ us (aq0  (1− a) r)
⇔ βau˜s (p
′) + β2u˜s (c2, z
′) ≥ (βa + β2) u˜s (q
′)
⇔ βa (u˜s (p
′)− u˜s (q
′)) ≥ β2 (u˜s (q
′)− u˜s (c2, z
′))
⇔ βaa (λ1 − λ2) (u˜s (m, z
′)− u˜s (c2, z
′)) ≥ β2aλ2 ((u˜s (m, z
′)− u˜s (c2, z
′)))
⇔ βaλ1 ≥ (βa + β2)λ2
where the last inequality again follows from the fact that u˜s (m, z) ≥ u˜s (c2, z) a.s.
By RI, we have
µ
{
βa
βa + β2
≥
λ2
λ1
}
= ρ (ap0  (1− a) r, aq0  (1− a) r) = ρ (p0, q0) = µ
{
β1
β1 + β2
≥
λ2
λ1
}
.
Since this is true for all λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1), it must be that
β1
β1+β2
and βa
βa+β2
have the same
distribution for all a > 0. If we let ξ := β1
β2
, then ξ has the same distribution as
βa
β2
= aξ + (1− a)
Equivalently, this implies that ξ − 1 has the same distribution as a (ξ − 1) for all a > 0. Let
κ be the infimum of the support of ξ − 1. Since β1
β2
≥ 0, κ ≥ −1. Since ξ − 1 and a (ξ − 1)
have the same distribution, it must be that κ = 0. Thus, a.s.
0 ≤ ξ − 1 =
β1
β2
− 1
or βs (c1) = β1 ≥ β2 = βs (c2) a.s. Since this was for arbitrary c1, c2 ∈ (0, m), it must be that
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β (c1) = β (c2) for all c1, c2 ∈ (0, m). Continuity of β then yields β must be constant on M .
F Repeated Menus
F.1 Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we formally define zt and prove Lemma 2. In order to do so, we first formally
define the space of menus following Gul and Pesendorfer (2004). First, define Z0 := {0} and
Zt+1 := K (∆ (M × Zt))
Also, let Xt+1 = ∆(M × Zt). Recall that ry,t (z) is the menu that follows z ∈ Z for t periods
and then ends with y ∈ Z for sure. First, we show that this is well-defined.
Lemma 13. For any y ∈ Z, ry,t : Z → Z is well-defined.
Proof. We will show by induction that ry,t : Z → Z is continuous. Clearly this is true
for ry,0 = y. Now, suppose that ry,t−1 is continuous so py,t ∈ ∆X is well-defined. We show
that py,t is continuous in p ∈ ∆X. Consider p
n → p and let u : X → R be continuous and
bounded. Note that since ry,t−1 is continuous,∫
X
u (c, z) dpny,t =
∫
X
u (c, ry,t−1 (z)) dp
n →
∫
X
u (c, ry,t−1 (z)) dp =
∫
X
u (c, z) dpy,t
so pny,t → py,t as desired. Lemma 1(i) from Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) ensures that ry,t is
continuous. Thus, by induction, ry,t is well-defined. 
We now extend this notation to menus that end in finite periods, i.e. menus in Zt. In
other words, we will inductively construct the menu ry,t (z) that replicates z ∈ Zi for t ≤ i
periods and ends with y ∈ Zj for sure for some j. First, for any y ∈ Zj , let ry,0 (z) = y for
any z ∈ Zi. Given ry,t−1, for any p ∈ ∆Xi and t ≤ i, let py,t ∈ ∆Xt+j denote the lottery
induced by ry,t−1, that is, for all measurable A× B,
py,t (A×B) = p
(
A× r−1y,t−1 (B)
)
Thus, py,t is the lottery that follows p for t ≤ i periods and then yields y for sure. Finally,
for any z ∈ Zi, define
ry,t (z) := {py,t : p ∈ z}
70
In other words, ry,t (z) ∈ Zt+j is the menu that follows z ∈ Zi for t ≤ i periods and then ends
with y for sure. Note that by the same argument as in Lemma 13, ry,t is also well-defined.
In the following, we define zt and show that zt is t-period. If we let y = 0 ∈ Z0, then
r0,t (z) ∈ Zt is the t-truncated version of z ∈ Zi for t ≤ i. Following Gul and Pesendorfer
(2004), we can now define the space of menus as
Z :=
{
z ∈
∏
t∈T
Zt
∣∣∣∣ zt = r0,t (zt+1)
}
,
where zt denote t-th argument of z for any t ∈ T . We endow Z with the product topology.
Theorem A1 of Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) shows that Z is homeomorphic toK (∆ (M × Z)).
Given z, we now formally define zt by constructing a menu z˜ ∈ Z as follows. First, for
any i ≤ t, let z˜i = zi. For i > t, set z˜i = rz˜i−t,t (zt) iteratively. Thus, z˜ follows z for i ≤ t
periods and then replicates itself going forward. Thus
z˜ := (z1, z2, . . . , zt, rz˜1,t (zt) , rz˜2,t (zt) , . . . ) = rz˜,t (z)
We abuse the notation here and the following; the second equation means z˜ ∈ Z corresponds
to rz˜,t (z) ∈ K(∆(M × Z)) by the homeomorphism between Z and K (∆ (M × Z)). Define
zt = z˜.
We now show that zt is t-period. We show that ry,t (Z) ⊂ Rt (y) by induction. First,
note that for all z ∈ Z,
ry,1 (z) = {py,1 : p ∈ z} ∈ K (∆ (M × {y})) = R1 (y)
so ry,1 (Z) ⊂ R1 (y). Assume the induction step that ry,t−1 (Z) ⊂ Rt−1 (y). Thus, for any
p ∈ ∆(M × Z),
py,t (M × Rt−1 (y)) ≥ py,t (M × ry,t−1 (Z)) = p (M × Z) = 1
Thus, we have
ry,t (z) = {py,t : p ∈ z} ∈ Rt (y)
so ry,t (Z) ⊂ Rt (y). This shows that
zt = rzt,t (z) ∈ Rt
(
zt
)
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so zt is t-period, where the equality means the correspondence based on the homeomorphism.
Finally, since zti = zi for all i ≤ t, z
t → z as i→∞ in the product topology. This concludes
the proof.
F.2 Property of Repeated Menus
As mentioned in Section 2.1, there is always some minimal t∗ for which z is t∗-period and,
in fact, t∗ is simply the first time z appears after the initial period. The following lemma
implies the results.
Suppose that z is a repeated menu (i.e., z ∈ Rt (z) for some t) and the menu z appears
at some period t′ before period t (i.e.z ∈ Rt−t′ (z)). The following lemma shows that the
menu is also t′-period.
Lemma 14. If z is a repeated menu (i.e., z ∈ Rt(z) for some t) and z ∈ Rt−t′ (z) for some
t′ < t, then z is t′-period.
Proof. We first show that Rt (z)∩Rτ (z) 6= ∅ implies Rt−1 (z)∩Rτ−1 (z) 6= ∅. Suppose y ∈
Rt (z)∩Rτ (z) and choose some p ∈ y. By definition, p (M ×Rt−1 (z)) = p (M × Rτ−1 (z)) =
1 so
p (M × (Rt−1 (z) ∩ Rτ−1 (z))) = 1
Thus, Rt−1 (z) ∩Rτ−1 (z) 6= ∅.
We now prove the lemma. Suppose z is t-period and z ∈ Rt−t′ (z). Thus, z ∈ Rt (z) ∩
Rt−t′ (z). Applying the above argument repeatedly yields Rt′ (z)∩R0 (z) 6= ∅. Since R0 (z) =
{z}, we have z ∈ Rt′ (z) as desired. 
G Stochastic Epstein-Zin and RI
Under stochastic Epstein-Zin, non-standard intertemporal preferences manifest themselves
in spurious violations of the classic independence axiom. Recall from Theorem 3 that RI
along with IRU characterize ICM. For an Epstein-Zin agent, PEU (i.e., ψs ≤ RRAs) or PLU
(i.e., ψs ≥ RRAs) can be detected by how RI is violated. Let ≥FOSD denote first-order
stochastic dominance.
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Proposition 5. Suppose ρ is stochastic Epstein-Zin. For 1-period z ∈ Z∗ and p1 ≥FOSD r
for all p ∈ z,
• ψs ≤ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≤ ρaz(1−a)r
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) r
)
• ψs ≥ RRAs a.s. implies ρz
(
δ(c,z)
)
≥ ρaz(1−a)r
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) r
)
Proof. First, suppose ψs ≤ RRAs a.s. Let y = az  (1− a) r. Since p1 ≥FOSD r for all
p ∈ z,
vst (z) = Est
[
sup
q∈z
ust+1 (q)
]
≥ Est
[
sup
q∈y
ust+1 (q)
]
= vst (y)
Let v2 = vs (z) and v1 = vs (z) so v2 ≤ v1. Now, for any p ∈ z,
us
(
δ(c,z)
)
≥ us (p)⇔ φs (c, v1) ≥
∫
M
φs (d, v1) dp1.
On the other hand,
us
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) r
)
≥ us (ap (1− a) r)
⇔ aus (c, y) + (1− a)
∫
M
us (c
′, y) dr ≥ a
∫
M
us (c
′, y) dp1 + (1− a)
∫
M
us (c
′, y) dr
⇔ φs (c, v2) ≥
∫
M
φs (c
′, v2) dp1
Since ψs ≤ RRAs, φs (·, v1) is more convex than φs (·, v2) as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Thus, for every p ∈ z, us
(
δ(c,z)
)
≥ us (p) implies us
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) r
)
≥ us (ap (1− a) r)
so the conclusion follows. The case for ψs ≥ RRAs a.s. is symmetric. 
Proposition 5 illustrates the type of permissible violation of the classic independence
axiom in the repeated choice setup. For example, under strict PEU, if z consists of a risky
and a safe option, then the probability of choosing the safe option will strictly increase if we
mix all options with the worst consumption. Note that the act of mixing changes the agent’s
continuation value; when intertemporal preferences are non-standard as in Epstein-Zin, this
generates violations of repeated independence. We can interpret this as a spurious violation
of the independence axiom due to ignoring the intertemporal structure of the problem.
Note that this does not permit any violation of independence; for example, the agent will
never strictly prefer mixtures. This is because the agent is still an expected utility maximizer
on the larger outcome space of pairs of consumption and continuation menus.
For example, let p1, q1 ∈ ∆(M). Given a repeated menu z = {(p1, z) , (q1, z)}, the agent
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will never choose the mixture
(
1
2
p1 +
1
2
q1, y
)
in the repeated menu
y =
{
(p1, y) ,
(
1
2
p1 +
1
2
q1, y
)
, (q1, y)
}
Even though there may be consumption smoothing due to intertemporal preferences, a
stochastic Epstein-Zin agent will never exhibit a strict preference for ex-ante hedging; in
other words, our model satisfies the stochastic version of betweenness from Dekel (1986) and
Chew (1989).
Let r = δ0 and note that for any 1-period z ∈ Z,
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) δ0 → δx
as a→ 0. This suggests the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 6. Suppose ρ and ρ′ are both stochastic Epstein-Zin with respective risk aver-
sion distributions piRRA and pi
′
RRA. Then piRRA ≥FOSD pi
′
RRA iff for all 1-period z ∈ Z
∗,
lim
a→0
ρaz(1−a)δ0
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) δ0
)
≤ lim
a→0
ρ′az(1−a)δ0
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) δ0
)
Proof. Let z =
{
δ(c,z), p
}
and ya = az  (1− a) δ0. Note that ya → δx as a→ 0 so
lim
a→0
vst (ya) = vst (x) = 0
Let ws (c) = c
1−RRAs denote CRRA utility. We thus have
lim
a→0
ρaz(1−a)r
(
aδ(c,z)  (1− a) δ0
)
= lim
a→0
pi
{
φs (c, v (ya)) ≥
∫
M
φs (c
′, v (ya)) dp1
}
= pi
{
φs (c, 0) ≥
∫
M
φs (c
′, 0) dp1
}
= piRRA {ws (c) ≥ ws (p1)}
The conclusion follows from the fact that piRRA ≥FOSD pi
′
RRA iff
piRRA {ws (c) ≥ ws (p1)} ≤ pi
′
RRA {ws (c) ≥ ws (p1)}
for all c ∈M and p1 ∈ ∆M . 
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